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ABSTRACT 
Partisan gerrymandering has proliferated in the last two decades, yet the Supreme Court has declined to rein in the 
offense by identifying a judicially manageable standard for evaluating claims in federal courts.  This Article 
highlights a second, promising path to remediating partisan gerrymandering: claims in state courts.  In the 
American federal system, state courts are the arbiters of their own constitutions and statutes and are allowed to 
offer protections that go beyond those afforded by the Federal Constitution.  We begin by discussing the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s opinion in Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018), which lays out two distinct theories 
for evaluating partisan gerrymandering claims, either on a statewide basis, or on a district-by-district basis.  The 
reasoning in these theories emanates from the U.S. Constitution, but state constitutions contain similar principles, 
including protection of freedom of association and equal protection of the law.  Because states are free to confer 
more voting rights protections than those contained in federal doctrine, these avenues are in no way foreclosed by 
the recent Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019), decision.  We also highlight unique state 
constitutional provisions with no analog in federal law, such as guarantees of free and fair elections and 
prohibitions on the passage of special laws.  We conclude by reviewing states where partisan gerrymandering 
offenses are likely, with special focus on states with potentially receptive courts, most recently North Carolina.  The 
Article is accompanied by two Appendices: one listing state court precedents striking down election laws and 
redistricting plans under theories of state law, and one listing constitutional protections that could be cited in a 
partisan gerrymandering complaint.  In summary, this Article seeks to provide a coherent theoretical framework 
for challenging partisan gerrymanders using federalist principles. 
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INTRODUCTION 
I believe that the time for plain speaking has arrived in relation to the outrageous 
practice of gerrymandering, which has become so common, and has so long been 
indulged in, without rebuke, that it threatens not only the peace of the people, but 
the permanency of our free institutions.  The courts alone, in this respect, can save 
the rights of the people and give to them a fair count and equality in representation.  
—Giddings v. Blacker (1892) (Morse, C.J., concurring)1 
 
Until recently, redistricting was not considered a topic to move the hearts 
of voters.  But over the past decade, gerrymandering, the practice of 
manipulating district lines for the benefit of one group or candidate to the 
detriment of others, has taken center stage in American politics.  
Gerrymandering is the subject of voter initiatives, news articles, and even 
commemorative jewelry in the shape of creatively-drawn districts.2  And legal 
challenges to redistricting plans have proliferated. 
This wave of new interest coincides with increases in partisan 
gerrymandering.  The last few decades have been a time of narrowly divided 
national sentiment.  Under such circumstances, electoral advantages accrue 
by prevailing in close contests.  In the several cycles before the 2000s, 
redistricting disputes focused largely on individual districts and targeted 
racial groups.  Since 2000, a record number of statewide district plans have 
                                                     
1 Giddings v. Blacker, 52 N.W. 944, 948 (Mich. 1892) (Morse, C.J., concurring). 
2 GERRYMANDER JEWELRY, http://www.gerrymanderjewelry.com (last visited Oct. 11, 2019).  
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given an advantage to a whole political party.3  Thus gerrymandering has 
emerged as a newly significant threat to fair representation of the major 
parties. 
Record partisan gerrymandering has been enabled by three factors: 
means, motive, and opportunity.  The means comes from partisan loyalty, 
which has reached new heights.4  The increased clustering of like-minded 
voters by location leads to communities with different voting behavior which 
can be separated by district lines.5  Partisan voter loyalty enables the use of 
sophisticated map-drawing technology to produce reliable election outcomes 
in greater numbers than would arise under neutral principles.6  The 
motivation emerges from the sharpened partisanship of U.S. politics, in 
which the ideological distance between the two major political parties has 
steadily increased since the 1970s, making legislative compromise less likely.7  
The rewards of gerrymandering are greatest in states with close partisan 
divisions, where over one-third of the seats can swing purely as a function of 
redistricting.8  With control of the U.S. House or a state legislature in the 
                                                     
3 See Sam Wang & Brian Remlinger, Slaying the Partisan Gerrymander, AM. PROSPECT (Fall 2017), 
https://prospect.org/article/slaying-partisan-gerrymander.  
4 See Alan I. Abramowitz & Steven W. Webster, Taking It to A New Level: Negative Partisanship, 
Voter Anger and the 2016 Presidential Election 1 (Nov. 9–10, 2017) (unpublished manuscript) 
(available at https://www.uakron.edu/bliss/state-of-the-parties/papers/abramowitz+webster.pdf) 
(describing the trend of increasingly negative partisanship in the United States in the 21st Century). 
5 See BILL BISHOP & ROBERT G. CUSHING, THE BIG SORT: WHY THE CLUSTERING OF LIKE-
MINDED AMERICA IS TEARING US APART, 5–7 (2008). 
6 The Brennan Center for Justice at the New York University School of Law maintains an excellent 
web page on ongoing redistricting litigation.  Michael Li, Thomas Wolf, & Annie Lo, The State of 
Redistricting Litigation, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (last updated Sept. 13, 2019), 
https://www.brennancenter.org/blog/state-redistricting-litigation.  Justin Levitt, a professor at 
Loyola Law School, Los Angeles, maintains an excellent website summarizing redistricting 
litigation from the 2010 and 2000 redistricting cycles.  See All About Redistricting, 
http://redistricting.lls.edu/cases.php (last visited Oct. 11, 2019).  
7 See David R. Jones, Party Polarization and Legislative Gridlock, 54 POL. RES. Q. 125 (2001); Sheryl G. 
Stolberg & Nicholas Fandos, As Gridlock Deepens in Congress, Only Gloom is Bipartisan, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 
27, 2018),  https://www.nytimes.com/2018/01/27/us/politics/congress-dysfunction-conspirac
ies-trump.html.  
8 For example, between 2010 and 2012, the North Carolina House delegation swung from 8     
Democrats, 5 Republicans to 10 Republicans, 3 Democrats despite the statewide vote moving 
toward Democrats.  This move of 5 seats represented over one-third of the 13-seat delegation.  See 
2010 Federal Elections, NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS RESULTS, 
https://er.ncsbe.gov/?election_dt=11/02/2010&county_id=0&office=FED&contest=0 (last 
visited Oct. 11, 2019); 2012 Federal Elections, NORTH CAROLINA STATE BOARD OF ELECTIONS 
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balance, manipulating even a small number of seats can take on central 
significance.  
The final factor, opportunity, arrived with the wave election of 2010.9  
Partisan gerrymandering is enabled when redistricting comes under the 
control of a single party.10  For Republicans this occurred in Florida, 
Michigan, North Carolina, Ohio, Pennsylvania, and Wisconsin.11  On the 
Democratic side, one state, Maryland, has shown clear evidence for partisan 
representational distortion since 2012. 
The net consequence of these gerrymanders was to ensure nearly 100 
safe or nearly-safe House seats in total for Democrats and Republicans 
combined.  In the wave election of 2018, 46 out of 435 House seats changed 
partisan hands, an incumbent-party loss rate of nearly 11%.12  In contrast, in 
the five states with surviving gerrymanders (Maryland, Michigan, North 
Carolina, Ohio, and Wisconsin), the incumbent party lost reelection only 3% 
of the time in the 2018 midterms.13  Meanwhile, in Pennsylvania, where 
districts were overturned by a state court, four out of eighteen seats flipped 
parties, or 22%.14  These election results show that while incumbents are re-
elected more often than not, the placement of district lines can strongly 
influence their odds of survival.15  Representationally speaking, the net result 
of gerrymandering this decade was that Republicans won about a dozen 
                                                     
RESULTS, https://er.ncsbe.gov/?election_dt=11/06/2012&county_id=0&office=FED&contest
=0. (last visited Oct. 11, 2019). 
9 For a discussion on what constitutes a “wave election,” see Charlie Cook, Midterm Elections Could Be 
a Wave, But Who's Going to Drown?, YAHOO! NEWS (July 30, 2013), https://news.yahoo.com/
midterm-elections-could-wave-whos-going-drown-080230757.html. 
10 In most states, this is referred to as a “trifecta,” in which one party controls both chambers of the 
legislature and the governorship.  However, there are some variations, such as in North Carolina, 
where the governor plays no role in the redistricting process.  See Who Draws the Maps? Legislative and 
Congressional Redistricting, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE (Jan. 30, 2019), https://www.brennan
center.org/analysis/who-draws-maps-states-redrawing-congressional-and-state-district-lines.  
11 See Samuel S.-H. Wang, Three Tests for Practical Evaluation of Partisan Gerrymandering, 68 STAN. L. REV. 
1263, 1263–1321 (2016).  
12 See Results of the House of Representatives Elections to the United States Congress, BALLOTPEDIA, 
https://ballotpedia.org/United_States_House_of_Representatives_elections,_2018 (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2019). 
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additional seats in Congress compared with neutral districting principles, and 
many more state legislative seats.16 
Partisan gerrymanders and other forms of gerrymandering are not 
mutually exclusive.  Race and class have become better predictors of party 
voting preference, a phenomenon called conjoined polarization.17  These 
increasingly tight links create incentives for partisans to commit other types 
of gerrymander, including the packing or cracking of minorities as a means 
of achieving an overall advantage.  In some but not all cases, these offenses 
are covered by federal law concerning the use of race in redistricting.18  
Because partisan gerrymandering removes general elections as a route 
for removing legislators, reformers have turned to courts for relief.19  But 
unlike race-based redistricting doctrine, partisan gerrymandering doctrine is 
incomplete.  After decades of flirting with the idea that partisan 
gerrymanders are justiciable,20 the Supreme Court declined this year to 
articulate a standard for discerning permissible versus impermissible 
partisanship in redistricting, failing at the last moment in two bitterly divided 
                                                     
16 See Samuel S.-H. Wang, Three Tests for Practical Evaluation of Partisan Gerrymandering, 68 STAN. L. REV. 
1263, 1298–99 (2016). 
17 See Bruce Cain & Emily Zhang, Blurred Lines: Conjoined Polarization and Voting Rights, 77 OHIO ST. L. 
J. 867, 869 (2016) (defining conjoined polarization as the alignment of race, party, and ideology—
particularly since the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965). 
18 Race-based redistricting law focuses on protecting the interests of minority groups with a history of 
discriminatory treatment by creating districts in which they have an opportunity to elect candidates 
of their choice.  Racial gerrymandering, meanwhile, polices the use of race in redistricting in any 
form, whether benevolent (to help minority groups) or malevolent (to harm minority groups).  The 
power of an individual vote is deemed to be diluted under federal law in two ways:  as a 
constitutional doctrine under the Fifteenth Amendment and as a statutory cause of action under 
section 2 of the Voting Rights Act.  See Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960) (holding that 
the restructuring of electoral district lines to deny equal representation to African-Americans 
violated the Fifteenth Amendment).  The future of these doctrines is uncertain as the Supreme 
Court has declared other, related protections for minority groups to be unconstitutional in recent 
years.  See Shelby County v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529 (2013) (striking down section 4(b) of the Voting 
Rights Act, whose formula delineated those jurisdictions required to obtain “preclearance” before 
making any changes to their election laws, as unconstitutional as applied).  
19 See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1934–35 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring) (“Partisan 
gerrymandering, as this Court has recognized, is ‘incompatible with democratic principles.’  More 
effectively every day, that practice enables politicians to entrench themselves in power against the 
people’s will.  And only the courts can do anything to remedy the problem, because gerrymanders 
benefit those who control the political branches.”) (internal citations omitted).  
20 See Davis v. Bandemer, 478 U.S. 109, 110 (1986).  
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opinions in Rucho v. Common Cause.21  However, the route leading to that 
failure generated concepts and theories that are now available for state courts 
to use if they so choose.  
In Davis v. Bandemer, the Supreme Court held that partisan 
gerrymandering could violate the Equal Protection Clause.22  Since that 
time, plaintiffs, advocacy groups, and academics have sought to develop a 
judicially manageable test for partisan gerrymandering claims.  Nearly 
twenty years passed between Bandemer and the next partisan gerrymandering 
case to reach the Court, Vieth v. Jubelirer.23  A plurality of four Justices in Vieth 
wrote that the failure of lower courts to coalesce behind a single standard 
meant there was no judicially discernable standard, and that partisan 
gerrymandering claims should be declared non-justiciable.24  The four 
dissenting Justices could not agree on a single standard.  Writing separately, 
Justice Kennedy suggested that advances in technology might yet lead to a 
judicially manageable standard based on statewide harms under the First 
Amendment.25 
Reformers then sought to create standards which Justice Kennedy could 
accept.  But in the spring of 2018, when two cases26 with new legal theories 
came before the Supreme Court, the Court sent the cases back to the district 
courts on narrow procedural grounds.  Less than two weeks later, Justice 
Kennedy retired.27  Justice Kennedy’s replacement, Justice Brett 
Kavanaugh, was suspected to be less receptive than Kennedy on questions 
of voting rights.28  Thus it fell to Chief Justice Roberts, likely the deciding 
vote, to face the challenge of how and whether to address partisan 
                                                     
21 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).  
22 Bandemer, 478 U.S. at 110. 
23 541 U.S. 267 (2004). 
24 Id. (plurality opinion). 
25 Id. at 312–13 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
26 Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018); Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018). 
27 See Michael Wines, Kennedy’s Exit Could Cripple Efforts to Abolish Gerrymandering, N.Y. TIMES,  June 30, 
2018, at A24.  
28 See Sarah Jones, We’re About to Find Out What Brett Kavanaugh Thinks of Gerrymandering, N.Y. MAGAZINE, 
Jan. 4, 2019, http://nymag.com/intelligencer/2019/01/the-supreme-court-will-take-up-gerry
mandering-in-march.html (“The court’s makeup has obviously changed since it declined to 
consider gerrymandering cases in June; Brett Kavanaugh is now a justice, which tilts the court even 
more dramatically to the right. That shift, combined with the court’s own record on voting rights, 
makes the court’s possible rulings difficult to predict.”).  
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gerrymandering without further harming the Court’s reputation.29  In a 
divisive 5–4 opinion written by the Chief Justice, the Court declared partisan 
gerrymandering to be a non-justiciable question, punting the issue to the 
political branches of the government and to the states.30 
In its failure to act in Rucho, the Supreme Court declined to continue the 
work it began in Gill v. Whitford, which laid out two intellectual frameworks 
for action, one by Chief Justice Roberts and one by Justice Kagan.  Chief 
Justice Roberts, writing for a unanimous court, had suggested that voter 
rights could be harmed on a district-by-district basis under the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, analogous to the Court’s 
pre-existing racial gerrymandering doctrine.31  Justice Kagan’s concurrence, 
joined by the Court’s liberal justices, described a harm that could come to an 
entire party or group of partisan voters on a statewide basis under the First 
Amendment’s protections of speech and association.32  
Even though the Supreme Court did not use these theories to put federal 
guardrails on the practice of partisan gerrymandering, judges in other courts 
still can.  All state constitutions protect freedom of speech, forty-seven protect 
the freedom of association, and twenty-four guarantee the equal protection 
of the laws.33  All of these rights have counterparts in the Federal 
Constitution.  And under the well-known principle of federalism, state 
constitutions can offer residents greater protections than afforded by the U.S. 
Constitution.34  For this reason, state courts present an attractive route 
toward achieving reform.  
For many reasons, state constitutional litigation in state courts has been 
an “under-the-radar” method of attacking illegal district maps.  Perhaps the 
                                                     
29 See Joan Biskupic, 9-0 Ruling Masks Deep Divisions on Gerrymandering at Supreme Court, CNN POLITICS, 
June 21, 2018, https://www.cnn.com/2018/06/18/politics/gerrymandering-roberts-kagan-
supreme-court/index.html.  
30 Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019). 
31 See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018).  
32 See id. at 1938 (Kagan, J., concurring).  
33 See James A. Gardner, Foreword:  Representation Without Party:  Lessons from State Constitutional Attempts to 
Control Gerrymandering, 37 RUTGERS L.J. 881, 887–89 (2006) (discussing state constitutions and how 
courts have historically applied them to partisan gerrymanders). 
34 See, e.g., Linda J. Wharton, Roe at Thirty-Six and Beyond:  Enhancing Protection for Abortion Rights Through 
State Constitutions, 15 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 469 (2009) (discussing how some state 
constitutions provide greater abortion rights than those embodied in the Supreme Court’s 
jurisprudence, and how state constitutional litigation can enhance those protections in the event 
that Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992), is overturned). 
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most significant reasons are that (1) following the Warren revolution on the 
U.S. Supreme Court, the federal system became a staunch defender of 
fundamental rights, including the right to vote; and (2) state courts have 
historically been perceived as either themselves partisan or susceptible to 
undue influence from the partisan branches of their respective 
governments.35  The broader redistricting reform movement, particularly in 
the thirty-plus years since Bandemer, has focused on achieving a federal 
solution rather than pursuing reform in individual states.  Scholarly efforts 
have focused on federal issues.  Here we turn the spotlight to state-level efforts 
and review examples in which state courts have served as a successful venue 
for changing district plans.  We will organize the examples into a theoretical 
framework, setting the stage for a more systematic approach in state courts 
and providing a primer for litigants and activists. 
Reformers won a landmark victory in 2018, not in the U.S. Supreme 
Court, but in the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.  Pennsylvania was the 
keystone in the Republican Party’s strategy for national dominance in 
Congress:  despite winning 51%, 44% and 46% of the statewide two-party 
vote share for Congress in 2012, 2014, and 2016, Democrats won only 28% 
of the state’s Congressional seats each year.36  In response to this disparity 
between votes cast and seats won, plaintiffs brought a lawsuit alleging that 
the Pennsylvania congressional districting plan violated the Free and Equal 
Elections Clause of the Commonwealth’s Constitution.37  
In its opening paragraph, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court laid out its 
argument for why the Commonwealth’s founding document offered the 
petitioners relief the U.S. Constitution could not:  
It is a core principle of our republican form of government that voters should 
choose their politicians, not the other way around. . . .  While federal courts 
                                                     
35 See 16 AM. JUR. 2D Constitutional Law § 88 (Westlaw rev. ed. 2019) (“The protections in the Federal 
Constitution provide a constitutional floor such that the Federal Constitution establishes a 
minimum level of protection to citizens of all states, but nothing prevents a state court from equaling 
or exceeding the federal standard.  In other words, a state constitution may be construed to afford 
broader but not narrower rights than similar federal constitutional provisions.”).  
36 See Tests, PRINCETON GERRYMANDERING PROJECT, gerrymander.princeton.edu/tests/ (click the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on the interactive map; click the left arrow next to the year 
displayed in the upper right-hand corner until you reach the reports analyzing data on the 2012, 
2014, and 2016 congressional elections, respectively) (last visited Oct. 11, 2019). 
37 See League of Women Voters of Pennsylvania v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania, BRENNAN CTR. FOR JUSTICE, 
Oct. 29, 2018, https://www.brennancenter.org/legal-work/league-women-voters-v-pennslyvania. 
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have, to date, been unable to settle on a workable standard by which to assess 
such claims under the federal Constitution, we find no such barriers under 
our great Pennsylvania charter.  The people of this Commonwealth should 
never lose sight of the fact that, in its protection of essential rights, our 
founding document is the ancestor, not the offspring, of the federal 
Constitution.  We conclude that, in this matter, it provides a constitutional 
standard, and remedy, even if the federal charter does not.  Specifically, we 
hold that the 2011 Plan violates Article I, Section 5—the Free and Equal 
Elections Clause—of the Pennsylvania Constitution.38 
By declaring its founding document a better guarantor of personal liberty 
than the Federal Constitution, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court achieved 
two goals:  it undid years of harm to its citizens, and it did so in a way that 
could not be reversed by the U.S. Supreme Court.  When the legislative 
defendants tried to appeal the opinion to the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice 
Samuel Alito, the Justice responsible for emergency appeals from the Third 
Circuit, summarily rejected the request without consulting his colleagues.39  
In the end, Pennsylvania’s congressional map was redrawn, and the 
November 2018 election resulted in a 55% Democratic, 45% Republican 
statewide vote and a 9-9 congressional split.40 
A second victory for reformers came in September 2019 via a North 
Carolina case, Common Cause v. Lewis.41  That case, heard in the Superior 
Court of North Carolina, concerned the maps for both chambers of the 
General Assembly, which had previously been partially redrawn in response 
to a finding of racial gerrymandering.  The unanimous decision by three 
judges, two Democrats and one Republican, found that both the House and 
Senate maps violated four separate clauses of Article I of the state 
constitution:  section 10, the free elections clause; section 12, concerning 
freedom of assembly; section 14, concerning freedom of speech; and section 
19, concerning equal protection.  The court directed that the gerrymandered 
                                                     
38 League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 740–41, (Pa.), cert. denied sub nom. 
Turzai v. Brandt, 139 S. Ct. 445 (2018) (mem.) (internal citations omitted). 
39 See Sam Wang, Pennsylvania Congressional Gerrymander Overturned – and It Seems Likely to Stick, 
PRINCETON ELECTION CONSORTIUM, Feb. 5, 2018, http://election.princeton.edu 
/2018/01/22/pennsylvania-congressional-gerrymander-overturned-and-its-likely-to-stick/#more
-20320 (last visited Oct. 11, 2019). 
40 See Tests, PRINCETON GERRYMANDERING PROJECT, gerrymander.princeton.edu/tests/ (click the 
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania on the interactive map; as of October 2019, the 2018 election map 
automatically appears; if a later year appears, click on the arrow left of the year to scroll to the 
appropriate Congressional election year) (last visited Oct. 11, 2019). 
41  Common Cause v. Lewis, 18 CVS 014001, slip op. (N.C. Super. Ct. Sept. 3, 2019). 
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maps may not be used for the 2020 election.  It further directed that the 
General Assembly redraw both maps without favoring a political party or 
using election data, at public hearings and in full public view.42  The remedial 
line-drawing process occurred over an eight-day period with legislators 
relying on maps algorithmically created by Dr. Jowei Chen.43  At the end of 
the process, the plaintiffs accepted the new Senate map, but objected to the 
House districts in two county clusters as being an insufficient remedy.  As of  
this writing, their appeal is pending in the state court of appeals.44  On the 
same day as the Common Cause plaintiffs filed their objections, another lawsuit, 
Harper v. Lewis, was filed challenging North Carolina's congressional districts 
based upon claims mirroring those in Common Cause v. Lewis.45  The same 
three-judge court has been assigned to Harper as heard Common Cause, 
and a new Congressional map for 2020 appears likely.46 
In this Article, we argue that it is time to look beyond federal courts for 
solutions.  With the Supreme Court’s move toward a more restrictive 
interpretation of voting rights under the U.S. Constitution, the way forward 
for election reform there is uncertain, especially for cases with partisan 
overtones.  We propose that reformers should instead follow the examples of 
Pennsylvania and North Carolina and turn to state courts and state 
constitutions to achieve their goals.  While lacking the sweeping breadth of a 
U.S. Supreme Court opinion, claims based on state law in state courts have 
three distinct advantages: (i) they can avoid removal to a federal venue; (ii) 
they can base their arguments in legal provisions that are broader than the 
First and Fourteenth Amendments alone; and (iii) they can interpret their 
                                                     
42  Id. at 349. 
43  See Melissa Boughton, It’s Up to the Court Now: A Redistricting Update After the Final Round of Filings, N.C. 
POL’Y WATCH (Oct. 10, 2019), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2019/10/10/its-up-to-the-court-
now-a-redistricting-update-after-the-final-round-of-filings/. 
44  Order Denying Petition for Discretionary Review and Motion to Suspend Appellate Rules, 
Common Cause v. Lewis, 18 CVS 014001 (Sup. Ct. N.C. Nov. 15, 2019) (available at 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/2019-11/2019-11-15-Order.pdf) (denying a 
motion asking the state supreme court to review the petition prior to a state court of appeals 
decision). 
45  Complaint, Harper v. Lewis, 19 CVS 012667 (Wake Cty. Super. Ct. Sept. 27, 2019) (available at 
https://www.brennancenter.org/sites/default/files/legal-work/2019-09-27-Harper%20v.%20Le
wis%20Complaint.pdf). 
46  See Melissa Boughton, It’s Up to the Court Now: A Redistricting Update After the Final Round of Filings, N.C. 
POL’Y WATCH (Oct. 10, 2019), http://www.ncpolicywatch.com/2019/10/10/its-up-to-the-court-
now-a-redistricting-update-after-the-final-round-of-filings/. 
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constitutional provisions with federal analogues more broadly than the U.S. 
Supreme Court interprets the federal clauses.47  
In Part I, we analyze the history of the U.S. Supreme Court’s voting 
rights jurisprudence, laying out an argument for why the Court has struggled 
to reach a consensus on a justiciable partisan gerrymandering standard.  Part 
II analyzes the district-by-district and statewide theories articulated in Gill v. 
Whitford more fully, creating two different groupings within which state 
constitutional provisions could fall.  It also briefly describes the types of 
evidence plaintiffs would need to prove standing under either standard, 
drawing from legal opinions and scholarship.  Part III surveys the types of 
protections offered by individual states, and how they fit into the district-by-
district and statewide frameworks established by Chief Justice Roberts and 
Justice Kagan.  It also surveys a rich history of state supreme court cases 
striking down districting plans under state law, demonstrating that state 
courts are not dispositionally opposed to ruling on such claims.  Part IV 
briefly summarizes the types of evidence plaintiffs will need to bring 
successful claims under these various constitutional provisions.  Part V 
evaluates legal routes in states with present and potential post-2020 
gerrymanders. 
                                                     
47 Under the United States’ federal system, state courts are the final arbiters of their own laws and 
constitutions, so long as they do not conflict with federal doctrine.  This gives state courts a choice: 
they can either interpret their constitutional protections of things like Due Process, Equal 
Protection, or Freedoms of Speech and Association to be identical to their federal analogues, or 
they can interpret them more broadly than their federal analogues.  If a state court chooses to follow 
the former path, the state is said to interpret its constitution in “lockstep” with the federal provision.  
When a state interprets its own constitutional provision in lockstep with a federal analog, the U.S. 
Supreme Court retains the right to review a state court interpretation of its own constitutional 
provision for fidelity to precedents interpreting the federal clause.  But if a state does not interpret 
its constitutional provisions in lockstep with federal analogues, state courts are free to interpret their 
constitutions as offering greater protections than the Federal Constitution.   
See D.C. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S.462, 476 (1983); Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. 
(1 Wheat.) 304 (1816); William J. Brennan, Jr., The Bill of Rights and the States: The Revival of State 
Constitutions as Guardians of Individual Rights, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 535, 550-51 (1986); William Brennan, 
Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489 (1977); Andrew A. 
Matthews, Jr., The State Courts and the Federal Common Law, 27 ALB. L. REV. 73, 76 (1963).  For more 
information on lockstep, see Daniel Hessel, Litigating Partisan Gerrymandering Claims Under State 
Constitutions, CAMPAIGN LEGAL CTR., July 17, 2018, https://campaignlegal.org/
sites/default/files/2018-07/CLC%20Issue%20Brief%20Litigating%20Partisan%20Gerrymande
ring%20under%20State%20Constitutions_0.pdf.   
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I.  VOTING, REPRESENTATION, AND THE THREE TIERS OF VOTING 
RIGHTS 
The phrase “voting rights” typically evokes laws and processes such as 
voter registration and identification laws, or long lines at polling places.48  
These are examples of the individual right to vote.  But even if all citizens 
were to gain and use their right to vote, they can still be denied fair 
representation.  This broader concept of voting rights requires a theory about 
how groups of voters ought to be represented, whether the groups are sorted 
by race, ethnicity, party, or some other classification. 
Professor Pamela Karlan articulated this multi-tier framework of voting 
rights in her article All Over the Map:  The Supreme Court’s Voting Rights Trilogy.49  
Detailing the Court’s precedents from Colegrove v. Green50 to Shaw v. Reno,51 
Professor Karlan highlights how the Supreme Court has slowly pivoted from 
a position of avoiding the “political thicket” to entering it for limited 
purposes.52  In the first tier of individual voting rights, Wesberry v. Sanders53 
and Reynolds v. Sims,54 the Court guaranteed the right of every qualified citizen 
to have his or her ballot counted.55  A second tier of voting rights occurs at 
the group level: the right of a group of citizens to have their votes aggregated 
in a way that gave them a chance of winning an election (aggregation rights).  
At this level, the Court has made some progress in the domain of race.  
The most prominent examples of court involvement in aggregation rights 
arise from the Fourteenth Amendment and the Voting Rights Act.  Because 
American representative democracy centers around the geographic 
aggregation of votes into districts, rather than proportional representation, 
                                                     
48 This conception of the “right to vote” is typically thought of as a right possessed by the individual 
which is abridged by administrative burdens, such as Voter ID laws, long lines at polling places, 
and issues regarding the counting of ballots.  As with the protections discussed infra, state 
constitutions frequently protect the right to vote.  For a more in-depth view of state constitutional 
guarantees of the right to vote, see Joshua A. Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 
VAND. L. REV. 89, 101–05 (2014). 
49 See Pamela S. Karlan, All Over the Map:  The Supreme Court’s Voting Rights Trilogy, 1993 SUP. CT. REV. 
245, 247 (1993).  
50 328 U.S. 549 (1946). 
51 509 U.S. 630 (1993). 
52 See Karlan, supra note 49, at 247.  
53 367 U.S. 1 (1964). 
54 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
55 See Karlan, supra note 49, at 245. 
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aggregation cases necessarily center around how those boundaries are 
drawn.56  Unlike participation barriers such as poll taxes or literacy tests, 
challenges to aggregation barriers, namely cracking and packing,57 are not 
fundamental rights subject to strict scrutiny under the Due Process Clause, 
nor are political parties or their voters suspect classes under the Equal 
Protection Clause;58 instead, challengers must prove both discriminatory 
intent and discriminatory effect to win their constitutional claims.59  
The third tier of voting rights has been the most challenging to police:  
the right of voters whose candidates were victorious to have their 
representatives participate in the process of governing (governance rights).  
The Voting Rights Act guarantees to qualifying minority groups60 certain 
aggregation rights, but no governance rights.  This can create problems for 
minority groups trying to achieve the policy goals their very representatives, 
elected to legislative bodies as a result of districts created by the Voting Rights 
Act, seek to achieve.  As Professor Karlan notes: 
Aggregation and governance interests do not always point toward the same 
[districting] plan.  A plan that maximizes the number of representatives a 
group directly elects could produce a generally unfriendly legislature.  For 
example, the creation of majority-black districts may enable black voters to 
elect some representatives to an assembly but may result in the election of 
hostile delegates from the remaining, majority-white districts; if the black 
community’s representatives are consistently outvoted within the legislature, 
the black community may have achieved its aggregation interest at the 
expense of a real role in governance.  Thus, apportionment poses 
fundamental choices about the nature of representation and the right to 
vote.61 
                                                     
56 See id. at 249 (“Perhaps the most pervasive set of aggregation rules in American politics concerns 
the geographical allocation of voters among electoral jurisdictions.  The way in which districts are 
drawn often determines which voters will be able to elect their preferred candidates and which 
voters will have their preferences go unsatisfied.”).  
57 See Samuel S.-H. Wang, Three Tests for Practical Evaluation of Partisan Gerrymandering, 68 STAN. L. REV. 
1263, 1271 (2016) (defining cracking and packing). 
58 Id. at 252–53 (internal citations omitted).  It should be noted that there are certain fundamental 
rights which are subject to lower levels of scrutiny, such as the right to vote in the context of voter 
ID laws.  See Crawford v. Marion Cty. Election Bd., 553 U.S. 181 (2008) (plurality opinion) 
(applying Anderson-Burdick balancing to determine the appropriate level of scrutiny to apply to 
Indiana’s voter ID law).  
59 Karlan, supra note 49, at 250. 
60 See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 12 (2009); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 46 n.12 (1986).  
61 Karlan, supra note 49, at 252–53 (internal citations omitted).  
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Partisan gerrymandering straddles the line between aggregation rights 
and governance rights.  Because partisan gerrymandering directly affects the 
ability of a party to enact a political agenda, it may create a concern that 
courts would have to go beyond what has worked for aggregation-type rights, 
i.e., apply a mechanical rule to a districting plan to determine if it is 
constitutional or not.62  Even presuming partisan intent, partisan effect is 
nuanced for several reasons.  First, party is a malleable characteristic, unlike 
race.  Second, a major party’s strength among voters is more likely than that 
of a minority group to be at near-parity with the side that commits the 
offense.  For these reasons, the establishment of a doctrine to handle partisan 
gerrymandering requires courts to break new intellectual ground. 
Some reformers sought to find a simple mathematical rule for identifying 
partisan gerrymanders which go “too far.”  Their hope was to apply 
advances in political science to create a bright-line test for revealing when a 
partisan gerrymander has occurred.  In his Vieth concurrence, Justice 
Kennedy put lower courts on notice that they should be ready to order relief 
should such a standard emerge.  In response, academics from mathematical, 
scientific, and social-scientific disciplines offered a variety of measures, each 
quantifying a different aspect of the fairness of either a single district’s 
election or a statewide set of elections.63  In some cases, the mathematical 
tools were designed specifically for the problem of representation;64 other 
tools had a long history going back as far as a century of use in other practical 
domains such as the manufacture of beer.65  Importantly, many tools 
measure the degree to which districts are packed or cracked in the aggregate, 
but without explicitly relying on the amount of representation won by either 
side.66  In all cases, the measures were designed to convert electoral 
unfairness into a numerical measure that would be useful to courts. 
                                                     
62 Karlan, supra note 49, at 253. 
63 See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 306 (2004) (Kennedy, J., concurring).  
64 See Nicholas O. Stephanopoulos & Eric M. McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 
U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 884 (2014); see also Jowei Chen & Jonathan Rodden, Unintentional 
Gerrymandering:  Political Geography and Electoral Bias in Legislatures, 8 Q.J. POL. SCI. 239, 242 (2013).  
65 See Brief for Heather K. Gerken et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 19, Gill v. Whitford, 
138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161). 
66 Relying on the amount of representation won by either party has been criticized as a form of 
proportional representation.  Even if a mathematical measure does not hold up the ideal of strict 
proportionality, using the number of wins in any way might be criticized as imposing a view as to 
the outcome that ought to arise from a statewide vote total.  Some mathematical approaches instead 
 
218 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:1 
   
 
II.  GILL V. WHITFORD GIVES RISE TO TWO APPROACHES FOR 
ANALYZING PARTISAN GERRYMANDERS, DISTRICT-BY-DISTRICT AND 
STATEWIDE 
Gill v. Whitford and Benisek v. Lamone arose from two extreme gerrymanders 
of the 2010 redistricting cycle:  Wisconsin’s State Assembly and Maryland’s 
Sixth Congressional District, respectively.  
Following the 2010 elections, Republicans found themselves newly in 
control of Wisconsin’s legislature and governor’s mansion, giving them 
control over the state’s redistricting process.  The legislature drew state 
legislative and congressional maps designed to provide a durable advantage 
over election outcomes for the decade.  
In Maryland, Democrats already dominated state politics.  In the 
redistricting process, they sought to enlarge their 6-2 majority in the state’s 
Congressional delegation.  Targeting a long-time Republican incumbent 
from the state’s rural western mountain district, Democrats redrew the Sixth 
District to turn an R+13% district in the 2010 election into a D+2% district 
in the 2012 election, bringing the Congressional delegation to seven 
Democrats, one Republican.67  
In Wisconsin, Bill Whitford and co-plaintiffs sued the State of Wisconsin 
and the General Assembly in federal court, arguing the State Assembly maps 
were so biased in favor of Republicans that they violated the First and 
Fourteenth Amendments.68  Plaintiffs relied on a new measure of partisan 
symmetry, the efficiency gap, as well as partisan bias and demonstrative 
maps.  Relying on all of the measures, the district court struck down the State 
Assembly map as an unconstitutional partisan gerrymander.69  This was the 
                                                     
use the pattern of win margins to detect whether one side’s voters have been systematically packed 
or cracked.  Such tests escape the proportional-representation problem, and have been broadly 
termed tests of inequality of opportunity.  See Samuel S.-H. Wang, Brian Remlinger, and Ben 
Williams, An Antidote for Gobbledygook:  Organizing the Judge’s Partisan Gerrymandering Toolkit into Tests of 
Opportunity and Outcome, 17 Election L.J. 302 (2018).  
67 Benisek v. Lamone, 266 F. Supp. 3d 799, 826 (D. Md. 2017) (Niemeyer, J., dissenting), aff'd, 138 S. 
Ct. 1942 (2018).  The Partisan Voter Index (PVI) measures how strongly a United States 
congressional district or state leans toward the Democratic or Republican Party, compared to the 
nation as a whole.  A rating of R+13% means that a district’s Republican partisan vote share is 
thirteen points larger than the national average. 
68 See Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (remanding that initial suit to permit voters to prove 
particularized harms). 
69 See Whitford v. Gill, 218 F. Supp. 3d 837, 843 (W.D. Wis. 2016). 
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first time in nearly three decades that a federal court had struck down a 
redistricting plan on partisan gerrymandering grounds.  
The plaintiffs in Benisek v. Lamone70 sued the State of Maryland under a 
different theory.  Instead of arguing that election outcomes proved an injury, 
plaintiffs contended that the redrawn district itself contained the necessary 
evidence.  They argued that by moving thousands of people in and out of the 
state’s Sixth District based on citizens’ voting history, the government had 
retaliated against citizens’ speech at the ballot box, thus violating First 
Amendment freedoms of speech and association.  In short, Republican and 
Republican-leaning voters of western Maryland had been denied an equal 
opportunity to elect a representative. 
Gill was argued in the Supreme Court in October 2017 on the merits, 
while Benisek reached the Supreme Court via interlocutory appeal71 and was 
argued in March 2018.  Both cases were decided in June 2018.  In Benisek, 
the Court affirmed the District Court’s denial of the injunction in a short per 
curiam opinion avoiding the merits.  In Gill, Chief Justice Roberts also 
avoided the merits of the case, writing a unanimous opinion vacating the 
district court’s judgment in Gill due to a lack of standing.72  But he also took 
a step toward defining a justiciable claim. 
A.  Chief Justice Roberts’s District-by-District Theory:  Individual Harms Require 
Alternative Maps 
Chief Justice Roberts described what “concrete and particularized” 
harms must be suffered to make the Wisconsin plaintiffs’ claims justiciable.  
He laid out a district-by-district theory focusing on the harms suffered by 
individual voters, rather than by groups of voters.73  Rather than accepting 
the district court’s finding that standing was satisfied by the dilution of the 
plaintiffs’ votes as members of the Wisconsin Democratic Party,74 the Chief 
Justice referred to the Reynolds v. Sims75 finding that the right to vote is 
                                                     
70 At the time of filing, the case was called Shapiro v. McManus. 136 S. Ct. 450 (2015). 
71 Benisek v. Lamone, 138 S. Ct. 1942 (2018). 
72 Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1923.  
73 A related doctrine is the right to vote under state constitutions.  For an excellent summary of those 
provisions, see Joshua Douglas, The Right to Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89 (2014). 
74 Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1926. 
75 377 U.S. 533, 561 (1964). 
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“individual and personal in nature.”76  By this reasoning, the dilution of a 
vote must be analyzed in the context of where it was cast, in a specific, 
individual district.77  In analogy to racially-based claims, Roberts noted that 
a voter who suffers an unconstitutional racial gerrymander can be provided 
relief by courts without redrawing the state’s entire map.78  Thus, he 
concluded, claims of party-based vote-dilution claims must be concrete and 
particularized enough to meet Article III standing. 
1.  A Single-District Approach for Partisan Harm is Reminiscent of Race-Based 
Harms  
In the opinion for the Court, the Chief Justice laid out the steps a plaintiff 
would need to take to allege a vote-dilution claim under the Fourteenth 
Amendment.  While acknowledging that he had no quarrel with the 
mathematics of the efficiency gap and other measures of partisan unfairness, 
he noted that such measures “do not address the effect that a gerrymander 
has on the votes of particular citizens” but rather measure the overall average 
“effect that a gerrymander has on the fortunes of political parties.”79  
Chief Justice Roberts further noted that under the plaintiffs’ proposed 
alternative districting plans, some plaintiffs would end up in a district with 
nearly the same partisan breakdown, meaning that their particular situation 
could be explained by natural geography rather than partisan intent.80  He 
concluded that the remedy must be “tailored to redress the plaintiff’s 
particular injury.”81  
This formulation of the district-by-district theory may be synthesized into 
the following working checklist for what a plaintiff must prove to win a case 
under an Equal Protection, single-district argument:  
• The plaintiff must live in a district in which their vote could help elect 
their candidate of choice; 
• The district the plaintiff currently lives in is drawn in such a way as to 
make the plaintiff’s casting of a ballot futile; and  
• The current construction of the district is unusual, or is unlikely to have 
arisen by chance. 
                                                     
76 Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1929. 
77 Id. at 1930. 
78 Id. at 1931. 
79 Id. at 1933. 
80 Id. 
81 Id. at 1934 (citing DaimlerChrysler Corp. v. Cuno, 547 U.S. 332, 353 (2006)). 
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This checklist defines whether a voter has been denied the opportunity to 
elect a representative.  Conceptually, it is reminiscent of the use of race in 
defining whether a minority-group voter has been denied the chance to elect 
a representative.  This conceptualization of a party-based harm under the 
Fourteenth Amendment would require an analysis which considers a state’s 
political and physical geography to determine whether a challenged district 
is abnormal or unusual.  
Demonstration of such a harm requires the drawing of alternative maps.  
In her four-vote concurrence, Justice Kagan noted that it would “not be 
hard” to prove packing or cracking because a plaintiff could produce an 
alternative map to show how the plaintiff’s vote could carry more weight 
under a different map.82  While Justice Kagan was correct that a single map 
can be valuable evidence, an even more persuasive way to make such a 
determination is by creating an ensemble of thousands or even millions of 
hypothetical maps, all of which comply with state and federal requirements.  
Modern computing can do this with ease.  An analyst can then compare the 
challenged district to the districts in the ensemble to determine whether the 
plaintiff’s situation is typical for the distribution, or an outlier.83  
An ensemble-map method was most recently used in the North Carolina 
partisan gerrymandering case Common Cause v. Rucho.84  There, the three-
judge panel struck down the state’s congressional districting scheme, relying 
in part on the expert testimony of Professor Jonathan Mattingly, a 
mathematician from Duke University.85  Dr. Mattingly used an algorithm to 
draw over 24,000 hypothetical congressional districting plans for North 
Carolina.  Comparing his ensemble of plans to the challenged plan, Dr. 
Mattingly concluded that the challenged plan was unlikely to arise from 
chance because over 99% of districting plans in his ensemble elected fewer 
                                                     
82 See id. at 1936 (Kagan, J., concurring) (“In many partisan gerrymandering cases, that threshold 
showing will not be hard to make.  Among other ways of proving packing or cracking, a plaintiff 
could produce an alternative map (or set of alternative maps)—comparably consistent with 
traditional districting principles—under which her vote would carry more weight.”).  
83 Indeed, Judge Frank Easterbrook also concluded that such evidence may be permissible to prove 
such a constitutional harm.  See Gonzalez v. City of Aurora, 535 F.3d 594 (7th Cir. 2008) (stating 
that plaintiffs could have used ensemble mapmaking to prove their alleged harm, though they did 
not in this case). 
84 Common Cause v. Rucho, 279 F. Supp. 3d 587 (M.D.N.C.), vacated, 138 S. Ct. 2679, remanded to 
318 F. Supp. 3d 777 (M.D.N.C. 2018) (requiring further consideration in light of Gill v. Whitford).  
85 Id. at 642.  
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Republican members of Congress than the challenged plan did.86  This 
analysis can also be used to compare an individual voter’s district-wide 
partisan environment with many possible alternative plans, thus turning a 
generalized claim of targeting into a concrete demonstration of harm to them 
individually. 
2.  Single-District Harms Add a Requirement for Big Data  
In contrast to claims of individual harm based on race, the demonstration 
of individual harm based on party requires several kinds of data, including 
information that is not collected in the Census.  First, the drawing of 
alternative maps requires accurate knowledge of voting precinct boundaries.  
This is necessary because districts are typically constructed from precincts.  
Second, it is necessary to know how each precinct voted, so that the voting 
behavior of an alternative district can be estimated.  This latter information 
comes from election results, unlike race, which comes from the Census.  
Precincts are normally constructed of multiple census blocks although there 
is no requirement in all states that boundaries be coterminous. 
A single-district claim creates a demand for data and computation.  This 
data is more difficult to acquire than lawyers (and likely, Supreme Court 
Justices) appreciate.87  Creating alternative maps requires precinct boundary 
data for every election in which they wish to measure partisan performance 
of proposed alternative districts.  Voting precinct boundaries are not static, 
but are frequently changed by state legislatures, by local election 
administrators, or by both.  This could act as a bar to plaintiffs without the 
resources or backing of outside organizations.  Efforts are now underway to 
make such information available broadly.88 
 For plaintiffs lacking money or informational resources, prospective 
plaintiffs may find it more attractive to demonstrate harms at a statewide 
level using simple statistical measures.  It should be noted that the Roberts 
opinion applies specifically to standing.  Indeed, he noted that “we need not 
                                                     
86 Id. at 643–45.  
87 See Michal Migurski, Open Precinct Data, MEDIUM, Apr. 9, 2018, https://medium.com/ 
planscore/open-precinct-data-eec479287715.  
88 One example of such an effort is OpenPrecincts.org, an initiative of the Princeton Gerrymandering 
Project which seeks to create a national database of precinct boundaries and election results and 
develop tools with which to use them.  See OPENPRECINCTS, http://openprecincts.org/ (last visited 
Oct. 11, 2019). 
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doubt the plaintiffs’ math.”89  Once the plaintiffs have established standing, 
statistical measures of statewide harms may still be useful.  Thus, when 
combined with traditional legal evidence like witness testimony and 
legislative records, a plaintiff has multiple ways to demonstrate vote dilution.  
B.  Justice Kagan’s Statewide Harms Theory:  Maps and Statistical Tests Are Both 
Sufficient 
While the theory of vote dilution has long been at the center of voting 
rights theories,90 partisan gerrymandering “causes other harms”91 than those 
suffered by individual voters.  In a four-vote concurrence in Gill v. Whitford, 
Justice Kagan states that partisan gerrymanders can “infringe [upon] the 
First Amendment rights of association held by parties, other political 
organizations, and their members.”92  Rather than measuring the “harm” 
for Article III standing purposes by the relative strength of an individual 
voter’s ballot, associational harms from gerrymandering could include 
increased difficulty in party “fundraising, registering voters, attracting 
volunteers, generating support from independents, and recruiting candidates 
to run for office.”93  Gerrymanders, says Kagan, weaken a party’s ability to 
perform all of these functions because gerrymandering places the state party 
at an “enduring electoral disadvantage.”94  Because these harms are suffered 
by parties or other groups across district lines, they have no need to prove 
district-by-district harm to satisfy the requirements of Article III.  
In these cases, standing would be established by (1) proving that the 
current plan, as enacted, is a partisan gerrymander; and (2) that the 
gerrymander’s deleterious effects on the party or organization diminish the 
organization’s ability to advance its goals or recruit others to its fold.  As with 
district-by-district claims, the former point could be proven via either 
alternative maps or an outlier analysis.  Indeed, Dr. Mattingly offered this 
exact argument in analyzing the makeup of North Carolina’s congressional 
                                                     
89 Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916, 1933 (2018). 
90 Indeed, vote-dilution cases have been possible under the Constitution since Gomillion v. Lightfoot 
identified a dilution cause of action under the Fifteenth Amendment. 364 U.S. 339 (1960).  
However, modern dilution claims are frequently based on section 2 of the Voting Rights Act rather 
than the Fifteenth Amendment.  
91 Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1934 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
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districts as a whole in the federal partisan gerrymandering case Common Cause 
v. Rucho.95  
Because the inequities of gerrymandering can manifest themselves in 
different ways in different states, there is no single mathematical measure 
which courts can apply in all circumstances.  Indeed, there are many tests a 
court receptive to such claims could use to measure partisan intent.96  These 
tests should not be thought of as being numerous to the point of confusion.  
Instead, they should be considered as comprising a diverse toolkit, being 
applicable to a diversity of situations.  
Tests may be categorized into two broad groups:  tests of inequality of 
opportunity and tests of inequitable outcomes.97  Judges applying a familiar 
test of discriminatory intent and discriminatory effect could simply look to 
the variety of tests which all measure the same constitutional harm (and 
frequently reach the same conclusion about the presence of partisan 
gerrymandering) to determine whether discriminatory intent or 
discriminatory effect exists.  Indeed, the Justices were informed of this 
argument by amici in Gill.98  
Proving both intent and effects is necessary to satisfy standing under 
Justice Kagan’s formulation of standing because plaintiffs must prove an 
“enduring electoral disadvantage.”99  For example, when measuring for 
inequality of opportunity, measuring for consistent advantage (the mean-
median difference)100 is most accurate in large, closely contested states.  But 
                                                     
95 279 F. Supp. 3d 587, 644 (M.D.N.C. 2018). 
96 Id. at 1933 (citing Brief of Heather K. Gerken et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 27, 
Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161) (citing Sam Wang, Let Math Save Our 
Democracy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 5, 2015, https://nytimes.com/2015/12/06/opinion/sunday/let-
math-save-our-democracy.html)). 
97 For more on this, see infra Part V. 
98 See Brief for Heather K. Gerken et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellees at 19–21, Gill v. 
Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (No. 16-1161). 
99 Gill, 138 S. Ct. at 1938. 
100 In large states with parties closely divided in strength, engineering a representational advantage 
usually results in a large mean-median difference.  Wang et al., An Antidote for Gobbledygook: Organizing 
the Judge’s Partisan Gerrymandering Toolkit into Tests of Opportunity and Outcome, 17 ELECTION L.J. 302, 
309–10 (2018).   Developed by Karl Pearson in 1895, the mean-median difference compares the 
average statewide vote captured by each party with the median district (the district that falls in the 
middle when they are ranked by one party’s vote share).  A map which does not mistreat one party 
would have a difference between the mean and median that is close to zero; a map which does 
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in states where one party dominates, measures of uniform wins (the chi-
squared test)101 can identify when a gerrymander has occurred.  
III.  THE FOUNDATION:  STATE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS WHICH 
CAN COMBAT GERRYMANDERING, SORTED INTO THE DISTRICT-BY-
DISTRICT VS. STATEWIDE FRAMEWORK 
Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Kagan offer two different paths to 
vindicating representational rights in courts.  But their ideas are not limited 
to federal law.  State constitutions protect these same rights, and more.  
Federal and state law work together to determine the rules and conduct of 
local elections.102  Under this federalist arrangement, the Supreme Court 
defers to a state supreme court which bases its opinion solely on issues of state 
constitutional law.103  When there are federal and state issues intertwined in 
a case, the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine can prevent 
the U.S. Supreme Court from reviewing the state court’s decision so long as 
the opinion rests substantially on state law.104  
                                                     
mistreat one party would see its median district tilted strongly toward one party, meaning one party 
gained a consistent advantage in the map’s districts.  
101 In large states in which one party dominates the political landscape, the natural distribution of 
districts would create a “median” district which strongly favors one party over another.  Id. at 309–
10.  Thus, analysts substitute in the chi-squared test for the mean-median difference.  In these 
single-party states, a map drawn without partisan intent would be expected to produce districts for 
the dominant party which vary in strength.  Some are blowout wins for the party, while others are 
carried by narrow margins.  A partisan gerrymander in these states would seek to maximize its wins 
by making its wins small enough to avoid wasting votes, but large enough to secure its majority for 
the next decade.  The chi-squared test identifies this artificial uniformity, and the underlying intent, 
in ways the other tests cannot.  
102 See U.S. CONST. art. I, § 4 (“The times, places, and manner of holding elections for Senators and 
Representatives, shall be prescribed in each state by the legislature thereof; but the Congress may 
at any time by law make or alter such regulations, except as to the places of choosing Senators.”).  
103 See Donald L. Bell, The Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine: Federalism, Uniformity, Equality 
and Individual Liberty, 16 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 365, 365–66 (1988); see also Robert Barnes, Supreme Court 




104 See Cynthia L. Fountaine, Article III and the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine, 48 AM. U. 
L. REV. 1053, 1053–54 (1999) (“The United States Supreme Court has constitutional and statutory 
authority to review the final judgments of state courts in cases involving federal questions.  Under 
the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine . . . , however, the Supreme Court will not 
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Because state supreme courts are the final authority for interpreting their 
own states’ constitutions, similarly worded provisions across different states 
can have extremely varied interpretations.  Some courts interpret their 
constitutional protections of freedom of speech, association, and equal 
protection in lockstep with their federal analogues.  In these cases, state 
supreme court rulings depend on federal interpretations, and the Supreme 
Court may review those decisions.  Other states can give their constitutional 
provisions their own independent meaning, affording greater protections 
than the Federal Constitution.105  In these latter cases, state supreme courts 
have the option of looking to intellectual arguments laid out by Justices 
Roberts and Kagan in Gill, whether or not those arguments are eventually 
used to make federal law.  Both Roberts’ district-by-district theory and Justice 
Kagan’s statewide theory can easily be applied to protections anchored in 
state law. In short, as the final arbiters of their founding documents, state 
courts are free to strike down unfair districting schemes.106  We will next show 
that state courts have a longstanding tradition of doing so.  
                                                     
review a . . . final opinion on state law that is independent of the federal issues and adequate to 
support the judgment.  In other words, if the Supreme Court’s opinion on the federal issues would 
not change the outcome of the case because the judgment rests on unreviewable state law, the 
Supreme Court will not review the federal issues in the case.”) (internal citations omitted).  
However, the Adequate and Independent State Grounds Doctrine is not the total bar that avoiding 
federal issues altogether is, because the Supreme Court may review the case to determine if there 
are “adequate and independent” grounds for the state court’s opinion.  See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 
463 U.S. 1032, 1044 (1983) (holding that the Supreme Court did not lack jurisdiction to decide a 
case on the asserted ground that the decision of the Michigan Supreme Court rested on adequate 
and independent state grounds).  Thus, while including federal issues in a complaint may 
nevertheless avoid federal review if a state court bases its ultimate opinion on adequate and 
independent state grounds, it is more advantageous for the plaintiffs to base their claim solely on 
state law grounds if they wish to preserve immunity from federal review. 
105 Rather than provide guidance on how each state’s courts have historically interpreted these 
decisions in the gerrymandering context (if they have at all) ourselves, we confine our analysis to a 
discussion of constitutional guarantees.  Litigators can apply their knowledge of their individual 
states to determine historical interpretations of each pertinent provision, and, if necessary, develop 
the arguments necessary to persuade a state court to adopt the arguments articulated therein. 
106 While we do not warrant that we have found every case throughout American history to strike 
down a redistricting plan under state constitutional law, any further cases found by resourceful 
researchers would only reinforce the core thesis of this Part:  that state courts have a long and rich 
history of protecting representational rights by striking down districting schemes for violating their 
respective constitutions. 
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A.  State Constitutional Protections Against District-by-District Partisanships 
By defining partisan vote dilution as an infringement on an individual’s 
right to vote, Chief Justice Roberts defined a theory focused on individual 
liberties.  State constitutions contain three protections which plaintiffs could 
bring on a district-by-district basis:  (1) Equal Protection; (2) Due Process; 
and (3) Prohibitions on Uniform or Special Laws.  While some states have 
interpreted these provisions to mirror the Federal Constitution, they are not 
bound to do so in the future.  Conversely, many states offer greater 
protections than those afforded by the Federal Constitution’s Fourteenth 
Amendment.  In this respect, state and federal law can be seen as 
complementary and equal partners in protecting voting rights. 
1.  Equal Protection/Due Process 
All fifty state constitutions contain provisions guaranteeing equal 
protection of the laws, due process of law, or a similar provision107 which 
state courts have interpreted to be analogous.108  While it is most common to 
make a direct analogy to constitutional protections, several states, including 
Alaska and California, interpret their provisions more broadly than the 
federal Equal Protection Clause.  In Hickel v. Southeast Conference,109 the Alaska 
Supreme Court applied the state’s Equal Protection Clause to the recently 
enacted legislative districting plan and struck parts of it down by stating: 
“In the context of voting rights in redistricting and reapportionment 
litigation, there are two principles of equal protection, namely that of ‘one 
person, one vote’—the right to an equally weighted vote—and of ‘fair and 
effective representation’—the right to group effectiveness or an equally 
powerful vote.”  The former is quantitative, or purely numerical, in nature; 
the latter is qualitative. 
The equal protection clause of the Alaska Constitution has been 
interpreted along lines which resemble but do not precisely parallel the 
interpretation given the federal clause.  While the first part, “one person, one 
                                                     
107 While this Article focuses on the way state courts give these general provisions broad meaning, 
potentially encapsulating a future partisan gerrymandering challenge, they have been used in ways 
similar to the Federal Constitution to find racial and equipopulation harms in redistricting.  See, e.g., 
In re S. J. Res. of Legis. Apportionment 1176, 83 So. 3d 597, 618 (Fla. 2012); infra Appendix A 
(column on state provisions guaranteeing equal population among its legislative or congressional 
districts). 
108 See Appendix A, infra, for a table containing all fifty constitutional provisions.  
109 846 P.2d 38, 47 (Alaska 1992). 
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vote,” has mirrored the federal requirement, the second part, “fair and 
effective representation,” has been interpreted more strictly than the 
analogous federal provision.110 
Several other state courts have also taken a more expansive view of the 
equal protection concept than their federal analogues in other contexts.  The 
country’s most influential state court, the Supreme Court of California,111 
has held that its Equal Protection Clause has “independent vitality” which 
can guarantee greater protections than those afforded by the federal 
clause.112  The Idaho Supreme Court has held that its constitution “stands 
on its own, and although we may look to the rulings of the federal courts on 
the United States Constitution for guidance in interpreting our own state 
constitutional guarantees, we interpret a separate and in many respects 
independent constitution.”113  The Supreme Court of Illinois notes that, 
while it looks for “guidance and inspiration” from the federal courts “in 
interpreting our State constitution, we make the final determination.”114  
And the Michigan Supreme Court has held that it has a “constitutional duty” 
to independently interpret the Michigan Constitution.115 
In short, guarantees of equal protection and due process are present in 
every state constitution, and are nearly universally applied to laws passed by 
their state legislatures.  The examples of the Alaska, Idaho, California, and 
                                                     
110 Hickel, 846 P.2d at 47 (quoting Kenai Peninsula Borough v. State, 743 P.2d 1352, 1366 (Alaska 
1987)) (citing Groh v. Egan, 526 P.2d 863 (Alaska 1974)) (clarifying the meanings of “one person, 
one vote” and “fair and effective representation”) (internal citations omitted). 
111 See Stephen J. Choi, Mitu Gulati, and Eric Posner, Which States Have the Best (and Worst) High Courts? 
1–2 (John M. Olin Program in Law and Economics, Working Paper No. 405, 2008) (ranking the 
Supreme Court of California as the court whose majority opinions are cited most frequently by out-
of-state state courts). 
112 See Assembly v. Deukmejian, 639 P.2d 939, 960 (Cal. 1982) (“Since [Legislature v. Reinecke, 492 
P.2d 385 (Cal. 1972) (in bank)], this court has also held that our state’s equal protection clause, 
adopted in 1974, has ‘independent vitality’ which at times may require greater protection than that 
afforded by the federal Constitution.”) (internal citations removed). 
113 Hellar v. Cenarrusa, 682 P.2d 539, 543 (Idaho 1984). 
114 People ex rel. Burris v. Ryan, 588 N.E.2d 1023, 1027 (Ill. 1991). 
115 See In re Request for Advisory Op. Regarding Constitutionality of 2005 PA 71, 740 N.W.2d 444, 
496 (Mich. 2007) (“When interpreting our constitution, therefore, ‘[t]he right question is not 
whether [the] state’s guarantee is the same as or broader than its federal counterpart as interpreted 
by the [United States] Supreme Court.  The right question is what the state’s guarantee means and 
how it applies to the case at hand.’  And though the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation 
of the Federal Constitution may be a polestar to help us navigate to the correct interpretation of 
our constitution, it is no more than that.  Ultimately, it is our constitutional duty to independently 
interpret the Michigan Constitution.”) (internal citations omitted).  
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Illinois Supreme Courts show that in states dominated by either major party, 
courts are not afraid to wield those provisions against laws that threaten the 
liberty of their citizens.  Combined with the equal protection argument laid 
out by Chief Justice Roberts, these guarantees offer an intuitive and 
straightforward rationale for litigation against partisan gerrymanders. 
2.  Prohibitions on Special or Local Laws 
Thirty-four states116 prohibit the passage of special or local laws.  These 
prohibitions have most often been construed to mirror federal equal 
protection guidelines, frequently applying rational-basis review to such 
laws.117  But several states have interpreted the prohibition more strictly, 
applying heightened scrutiny under the theory that these laws violate the 
rights of individuals to be treated equally under the law.  
Of particular interest are California, Georgia, Kentucky, and Ohio.  The 
California Supreme Court applies heightened scrutiny to all cases in which 
the plaintiff is a member of a suspect class.118  The Supreme Court of Georgia 
applies a variable standard of scrutiny depending on the status of the plaintiff, 
but the standard falls above rational basis.119  The Kentucky Supreme Court, 
meanwhile, applies a standard slightly higher than rational basis,120 as does 
the Ohio Supreme Court.121  State courts in North Dakota,122 
                                                     
116 See infra Appendix B. 
117 Courts applying rational basis review will uphold a statute or regulation if it is rationally related to 
a legitimate governmental interest.  See Thomas B. Nachbar, The Rationality of Rational Basis Review, 
102 VA. L. REV. 1627, 1629 (2016) (discussing rational basis review). 
118 See In re Mary G., 151 Cal. App. 4th. 184, 198–99 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007).  
119 Dev. Auth. v. State, 684 S.E.2d 856, 859 (Ga. 2009) (holding that the state constitution’s 
requirement of uniform operation of general laws requires “alike operation” on all persons who 
come under its scope). 
120 See Parker v. Webster Cty. Coal, LLC (Dotiki Mine), 529 S.W.3d 759, 770 (Ky. 2017) (holding that 
legislation is unconstitutional special law when it arbitrarily or beyond reasonable justification 
discriminates against some persons or objects and favors others). 
121 See  State ex rel. Zupancic v. Limbach, 568 N.E.2d 1206, 1211–12 (Ohio 1991) (holding that a 
statute is constitutional under Ohio’s prohibition on special laws if it achieves a legitimate 
governmental interest and operates equally on all persons or entities or persons included within its 
provisions). 
122 See State v. Hamilton, 129 N.W. 916, 918 (N.D. 1910) (holding that a law for the nomination of 
candidates for office which required different levels of support in different counties in the state was 
unconstitutionally non-uniform). 
 
230 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:1 
   
 
Pennsylvania,123 and Kansas124 have used the provisions in the past to strike 
down statutes relating to elections or education that treated classes of persons 
differently. 
These prohibitions on local or special laws are helpful to plaintiffs 
bringing vote-dilution claims because they are conceptually independent of 
the Federal Constitution.  Without a direct federal analog, a state court may 
feel freer to depart from U.S. Supreme Court interpretations of equal 
protection and establish its own, independent standards.  This raises the 
possibility that these provisions, rather than due process or equal protection 
analogs, may offer plaintiffs hope to bring a district-by-district claim using 
Justice Roberts’ theory, even if a Fourteenth Amendment-based claim is 
someday found to be non-justiciable. 
B. Finding Proscriptions Against Partisanship in Statewide-Harm Constitutional 
Provisions 
State constitutional protections are not limited to the district-by-district 
framework envisioned by Chief Justice Roberts.  Claims can also be 
grounded in the rights of free speech and association, as well as mandates 
that elections be free, equal, or pure.  
1.  Freedom of Speech/Expression/Association (Retaliation Theory) 
All fifty state constitutions protect the freedom of speech in various ways.  
The most common structure is exemplified by Alabama, which protects the 
“liberty of speech or of the press” and permits any person to “speak, write, 
and publish his sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of 
that liberty.”125  Some states go further rhetorically:  North Carolina’s 
Constitution says that “[f]reedom of speech and of the press are two of the 
                                                     
123 See Butcher v. Bloom, 203 A.2d 556, 573 (Pa. 1964) (“[A] legislative scheme which creates single-
member districts and multi-member districts in an arbitrary manner would be objectionable. . . . 
[I]n the absence of any reasonable explanation or justification (historical or otherwise), such 
districting might be the result of gerrymandering for partisan advantage and, in that event, would 
be arbitrary and capricious.”).  
124 State ex rel. Jackson v. Sch. Dist. No. 2, 34 P.2d 102, 103 (Kan. 1934) (holding that a statute 
detaching land from one school district and attaching it to another was an unconstitutional attempt 
to delegate legislative power to certain landowners, making the law a special law).  
125 ALA. CONST. § 4; see also CAL. CONST. art. I, § 2(a) (“Every person may freely speak, write, and 
publish his or her sentiments on all subjects, being responsible for the abuse of this right.  A law 
may not restrain or abridge liberty of speech or press.”).  
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great bulwarks of liberty and therefore shall never be restrained, but every 
person shall be held responsible for their abuse.”126  Furthermore, forty-seven 
state constitutions guarantee freedom of association, the exceptions being 
Maryland, Minnesota, and New Mexico.127 
The U.S. Supreme Court has used the First Amendment’s speech 
protections to strike down election laws.128  This is particularly true in the 
realm of campaign finance.  In Citizens United v. Federal Election Commission,129 
the Court struck down the prohibition in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform 
Act of 2002 (BCRA) which prohibited corporations and labor unions from 
making independent expenditures in federal elections.  Holding that prior 
precedents of the Court finding a right to restrict corporate spending in 
politics to prevent distortions in electoral discourse interfered with the open 
marketplace of ideas protected by the First Amendment, the Supreme Court 
overruled the line of cases as unconstitutional.130  The Court extended this 
logic to strike down aggregate contribution limits in 2014,131 leaving 
contribution limits to individual campaigns and bans on soft money as the 
only remaining restriction of BCRA.  
Although the Supreme Court has not yet extended First Amendment-
based reasoning to redistricting, Justice Anthony Kennedy first discerned 
such a route in his concurrence in Vieth v. Jubelirer.132  He wrote that targeting 
the placement of voters in districts based on partisanship to reduce their 
power was a form of viewpoint discrimination.133  Justice Kagan furthered 
                                                     
126 N.C. CONST. art I, § 14.  
127 Rather than reading a “freedom of association” into another constitutional provision, such as 
substantive due process, all three states’ highest courts have largely applied the Supreme Court’s 
incorporation doctrine of the First Amendment against the states when doing an association 
analysis.  
128 Notably, the Court has also used the First Amendment to abolish government censorship in other 
areas, even in gruesome areas such as pornographic depictions of animal cruelty, so-called “crush 
videos.”  United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460 (2010) (declaring statute criminalizing the depiction 
of animal cruelty unconstitutional prohibition on free speech).  
129 558 U.S. 310, 361–62 (2010). 
130 Id. at 354 (“Austin interferes with the ‘open marketplace’ of ideas protected by the First 
Amendment.”).  
131 McCutcheon v. Fed. Election Comm’n, 572 U.S. 185 (2014).  
132 541 U.S. 267 (1994). 
133 Id. at 314 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“First Amendment concerns arise when a State enacts a law 
that has the purpose and effect of subjecting a group of voters or their party to disfavored treatment 
by reason of their views. In the context of partisan gerrymandering, that means that First 
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this theory in her own concurrence in Gill v. Whitford.134  The Supreme Court 
declined to use this reasoning in 2019 in two cases:  Benisek v. Lamone and 
Rucho v. Common Cause.135  Nonetheless, state supreme courts may still use 
Justice Kagan’s concurrence as guidance for how to pursue their claims 
under state constitution-based protections of viewpoint and association.  
Historically, most state courts which have struck down election laws as 
violations of Free Speech protections have modeled, if not entirely followed, 
the U.S. Supreme Court’s doctrinal lead by focusing on campaign finance 
regulations.  Foreshadowing the Roberts Court’s approach, in 2000, the 
Supreme Court of Nebraska struck down an independent expenditure law as 
an infringement on free speech under the state constitution’s Free Speech 
Clause.136  Some state supreme courts have resisted non-retaliation 
arguments under a Freedom of Speech argument, instead reframing quasi-
vote-dilution cases using Equal Protection arguments.137  However, with 
insights of Justice Kagan’s concurrence available to them, state courts may 
be more receptive to a retaliation argument under First Amendment 
analogues in future litigation. 
2. Free and Equal/Purity of Elections Clauses 
We now turn to a state constitutional provision which lacks a counterpart 
in the Federal Constitution: a mandate that elections be some combination 
                                                     
Amendment concerns arise where an apportionment has the purpose and effect of burdening a 
group of voters’ representational rights.”).  
134 Gill v. Whitford, 138 S. Ct. 1916 (2018) (Kagan, J., concurring). 
135 These two cases were consolidated in Rucho v. Common Cause, 139 S. Ct. 2484 (2019).   
136 State ex rel. Steinberg v. Moore, 605 N.W.2d 440, 449 (Neb. 2000) (“Based upon our independent 
review, we determine that § 14, as codified at § 32-1614, unconstitutionally infringes upon the right 
of groups and committees to engage in political speech through the making of independent 
expenditures as defined by Nebraska law.”).  
137 See Legislative Redistricting Cases, 331 Md. 574, 601, 629 (Md. 1993) (“Skinner and Weiner claim 
that the population disparities among the legislative districts in the Governor’s plan also violate 
their First Amendment right to freedom of speech. They argue that by assigning them fewer 
representatives per resident than other areas, the Governor’s plan dilutes their vote and hence their 
‘political expression’ relative to other Maryland citizens. The Special Master rejected this assertion 
‘as simply another way of framing the contentions under the 14th Amendment’ with regard to 
population equality. The Special Master was right”).  While the quoted language relates to the 
Court of Appeals of Maryland (Maryland’s highest court) analyzing the Federal Constitution, it is 
likely that the Court’s interpretation would be similar under its own state constitution because it 
could have found for Skinner and Weiner under the state’s guarantees, but elected not to do so.  
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of free, equal, or pure.  Twenty-eight state constitutions have provisions 
calling for elections to be “free and equal,” “free and fair,” or meet some 
other similar standard like “purity.”  For example, Arkansas’s Constitution 
similarly guarantees that “[e]lections shall be free and equal.  No power, civil 
or military, shall ever interfere to prevent the free exercise of the right of 
suffrage.”138  Vermont’s Constitution goes even further, noting that elections 
“ought to be free and without corruption.”139  And Colorado’s Constitution 
mandates purity in its elections:  “The general assembly [sic] shall pass laws 
to secure the purity of elections, and guard against abuses of the elective 
franchise.”140  These provisions date back to the earliest days of the United 
States, appearing in the constitutions or bills or declarations of rights of 
Pennsylvania, North Carolina, and Virginia in 1776; Vermont in 1777; 
Massachusetts in 1780; New Hampshire in 1784; and Kentucky and 
Maryland in 1792. 
In early 2018, the Pennsylvania Supreme Court relied on such a 
provision in its own Constitution to strike down the state’s congressional 
map.  In League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth,141 the Pennsylvania Supreme 
Court held that under Article I, Section 5 of the Pennsylvania Constitution, 
which mandates that elections “shall be free and equal,” laws placing voters 
into individual districts must “make their votes equally potent”142 in their 
ultimate elections for congressional representatives: 
[O]ur Commonwealth’s commitment to neutralizing factors which unfairly 
impede or dilute individuals’ rights to select their representatives was borne 
of our forebears’ bitter personal experience suffering the pernicious effects 
resulting from previous electoral schemes that sanctioned such 
discrimination. Furthermore, adoption of a broad interpretation guards 
against the risk of unfairly rendering votes nugatory, artificially entrenching 
representative power, and discouraging voters from participating in the 
electoral process because they have come to believe that the power of their 
individual vote has been diminished to the point that it “does not count.” A 
broad and robust interpretation of Article I, Section 5 serves as a bulwark 
against the adverse consequences of partisan gerrymandering.143 
                                                     
138 ARK. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
139 VT. CONST. ch. I, art. VIII. 
140 COLO. CONST. art VII, § 11. 
141 178 A.3d 737 (Pa. 2018).  
142 Id. at 792–93 (Pa. 2018) (quoting Patterson v. Barlow, 60 Pa. 54, 75 (1869) (upholding a poll tax 
against claims that it violated the “free and equal” clause)); id. at 814. 
143 Id. 
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The decision relied solely on the “free and equal” provision, but also 
invoked protections in the Pennsylvania Constitution of free speech, freedom 
of assembly, equal protection, compactness, contiguity, and respect for the 
integrity of political subdivisions in support of it.144  
However, although the Pennsylvania Supreme Court ultimately 
described the harm they found as “vote dilution,” it was not the same vote 
dilution contemplated in Gill by Chief Justice Roberts.  Instead, it was the 
vote dilution to an individual voter, which necessarily implicates the votes of 
other voters, requiring wholesale changes to the map as a remedy.145  
 Pennsylvania’s and North Carolina’s state courts are not the only ones 
to use the guarantees of free, equal, or pure elections to strike down election-
related laws.  Over a century ago, the Colorado Supreme Court held that 
the connivance of private corporations with county officials to create voting 
precincts controlled by corporations to the exclusion of the people violated 
the state’s guarantee to all citizens of “the free exercise of the right of 
suffrage.”146  And in 2009, the Arizona Court of Appeals held that its 
constitution’s guarantee of “free and equal” elections was implicated when 
ballot machines did not properly count ballots.147  Judicial interpretations of 
                                                     
144 Id. 
145 Id. at 804–14. 
146 Neelley v. Farr, 158 P. 458, 466–68 (Colo. 1916) (“These companies plainly connived with certain 
county officials to secure the creation of election precincts, bounded so as to include their private 
property only, and with lines marked by their own fences, or guarded by their own armed men, 
and within which were only their own employés.  They excluded the public from entrance to such 
election precincts, labeled the same as private property, and warned the public that entrance 
thereon constituted trespass.  They denied the right of free public assemblage within such election 
precincts, and likewise the right of free or open discussion of public questions therein.  They denied 
the right to circulate election literature or the distribution of the cards of candidates within such 
precincts.  They secured the selection of their own employés exclusively as judges and clerks of 
election, and by the location of precinct boundaries no other than their employees could so serve.  
They apparently made the registration lists from their pay rolls.  They kept such lists in their private 
places of business and in charge of their employés.  They prohibited all public investigation within 
such election precincts as to the qualification of the persons so registered as electors of the precinct.  
Through their employés acting as election officials they assisted numerous non English-speaking 
persons to vote by marking their ballots for them, in plain violation of the law.  They provided other 
non English-speaking persons with the fraudulent device heretofore described, by which such 
persons might be enabled to vote the Republican ticket without being able to read either the name 
of the candidate or the party ticket for which they so voted.  They coerced and intimidated their 
employés in many instances.”). 
147 See Chavez v. Brewer, 214 P.3d 397, 408 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2009) (holding that the plaintiffs had stated 
a valid cause of action under the state constitution’s “free and equal” provision based on voting 
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a “pure” election are less common, but they typically center on issues where 
some event has occurred which throws the election’s result into doubt.  In 
the partisan gerrymandering context, an argument could be made that the 
votes of a targeted group could be so diluted as to render the legitimacy of 
an election in doubt.  These examples, as well as others, provide a rich history 
of case law which plaintiffs in various states can rely on to expand the 
doctrine governing partisan gerrymandering.  
A few state constitutions are even more explicit in their calls for equitable 
representation, providing explicitly for “equal representation” or “an equal 
right to elect” state officials.  These provisions could be interpreted as 
implying that each vote should have an equal effect in determining 
representation.148  Such provisions are found in several states with no 
mechanism for enacting independent redistricting commissions, such as 
North Dakota (“The legislative assembly shall guarantee, as nearly as 
practicable, that every elector is equal to every other elector in the state in 
the power to cast ballots for legislative candidates”),149 South Carolina (“All 
elections shall be free and open, and every inhabitant of this State possessing 
the qualifications provided for in this Constitution shall have an equal right 
to elect officers and be elected to fill public office”),150 and West Virginia 
(“Every citizen shall be entitled to equal representation in the government, 
and, in all apportionments of representation, equality of numbers of those 
entitled thereto, shall as far as practicable, be preserved”).151  The West 
Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals has already used this language to strike 
down laws electing delegates to a state constitutional convention on 
malapportionment grounds.152 
Eleven states require that elections be “pure.”  Vermont calls for elections 
to be “free and pure,”153 while Illinois requires that the legislature “insure . . . 
                                                     
machines not counting ballots properly); see also Gunaji v. Macias, 31 P.3d 1008, 1013 (N.M. 2001) 
(discussing the New Mexico Constitution’s “free and open” elections clause).  
148 See, e.g., MASS. CONST. pt. I, art. IX (“[T]he inhabitants of this commonwealth . . . have an equal 
right to elect officers, and to be elected, for public employments.”); N.H. CONST. pt. I, art. XI 
(“[E]very inhabitant of the state of 18 years of age and upwards shall have an equal right to vote in 
any election.”).  
149 N.D. CONST. art. IV, § 2. 
150 S.C. CONST. art. I, § 5.  
151 W. VA. CONST. art. II, § 4.  
152 See State ex rel. Smith v. Gore, 143 S.E.2d 791, 794–95 (W. Va. 1965). 
153 VT. CONST. ch. I, art. VIII.  
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the integrity of the election process.”154  Michigan’s Constitution mandates 
that the Legislature “enact laws . . . [to] preserve the purity of elections.”155  
Michigan’s Supreme Court interpreted this clause to mean that “any law 
enacted by the Legislature which adversely affects the purity of elections is 
constitutionally infirm,” defining “purity of elections” as requiring “fairness 
and evenhandedness in the election laws.”156  Tennessee’s Constitution gives 
the General Assembly discretion on whether to enact laws securing “the 
freedom of elections and the purity of the ballot box.”157  A multitude of cases 
have construed the applicability of purity constitutional provisions to 
individual voting rights such as voter identification and ballots.158 
To apply the free-and-equal and purity provisions of state constitutions 
to block excessively partisan redistricting, the next step would be identifying 
indicia of an offense.  Such evidence would include single-party control of 
redistricting, as well as patterns of behavior such as the active exclusion of 
the opposing major political party in the redistricting process.  Mathematical 
evidence could come from a wide variety of tests which can be sorted into 
two categories:  violations of the opportunity to elect representatives, and 
inequitable outcomes.159 
To summarize, guarantees of free, equal, and elections have a rich history 
in American jurisprudence.  They have been used to strike down unfair or 
biased election laws for more than a century.  The recent example set by the 
Pennsylvania Supreme Court shows how such a route may be used to 
regulate extreme partisan gerrymanders.  
C.  Regulations on Partisanship in Districting & Competitiveness 
Some states have adopted constitutional provisions which regulate the 
partisan outcomes in drawing district lines.  These fall into two categories:  
(1) prohibitions on district lines favoring parties or persons, whether unduly 
or explicitly; and (2) requirements that districts be competitive.  
                                                     
154 ILL. CONST. art. III, § 4.  
155 MICH. CONST. art. II, § 4(2). 
156 McDonald v. Grand Traverse Cty. Election Comm’n, 662 N.W.2d 804, 816–17 (Mich. Ct. App. 
2003) (quoting Socialist Workers Party v. Sec’y of State, 317 N.W.2d 1, 10 (Mich. 1982)) (quoting 
Wells v. Kent Cty. Bd. of Election Comm’rs, 168 N.W.2d 222, 227 (Mich. 1969)); see also Elliott v. 
Sec’y of State, 294 N.W. 171, 173 (Mich. 1940). 
157 TENN. CONST. art. IV, § 1.  
158 See infra Appendices A, B. 
159 See, e.g., Samuel S.-H. Wang et al., An Antidote to Gobbledygook:  Organizing the Judge’s Partisan 
Gerrymandering Toolkit into Tests of Opportunity and Outcome, 17 ELECTION L.J. 302, 305 (2018). 
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1. Prohibitions on Redistricting to Protect a Party or Person 
Sixteen states have adopted reforms explicitly aimed at eliminating 
partisan gerrymandering.  They have inserted language into their state 
constitutions or enacted statutes prohibiting the construction of districts to 
either favor or disfavor a political party, incumbent, or candidate.  Other 
states have prohibited the use of political data altogether, except where 
necessary to comply with the Voting Rights Act.  These tools are potentially 
effective at attacking gerrymanders, subject to interpretation by their state 
supreme courts.160  And because these provisions directly attack partisan 
gerrymanders,161 they will obviously be cited in states which contain them.162  
                                                     
160 Because stare decisis is not an absolute constraint on courts of last resort, state supreme courts which 
have in the past interpreted constitutional prohibitions on partisan gerrymandering or traditional 
districting principles strictly may nevertheless change course in later decades.  For an example of 
such vacillation on proper redistricting standards, see the varying interpretations of the Maryland 
Court of Appeals regarding the State’s compactness metric.  Compare In re 2012 Legislative 
Districting of the State, 80 A.3d 1073, 1082 (Md. 2012) (“These challengers, as do all challengers 
to a legislative reapportionment plan, carry the burden of demonstrating the law’s invalidity.  Once, 
however, a proper challenge under Art. III, Sec. 4 is made and is supported by ‘compelling 
evidence,’ the State has the burden of producing sufficient evidence to show that the districts are 
contiguous and compact, and that due regard was given to natural and political subdivision 
boundaries.”) with In re Legislative Districting, 805 A.2d 292, 326 (Md. 2002) (“[I]f in the exercise 
of discretion, political considerations and judgments result in a plan in which districts: are non-
contiguous; are not compact; with substantially unequal populations; or with district lines that 
unnecessarily cross natural or political subdivision boundaries, the plan cannot be sustained.  That 
a plan may have been the result of discretion, exercised by the one entrusted with the responsibility 
of generating the plan, will not save it.  The constitution ‘trumps’ political considerations.  Politics 
or non-constitutional considerations never ‘trump’ constitutional requirements.”) and Legislative 
Redistricting Cases, 629 A.2d 646, 654 (Md. 1993) (“[Districts may assume] an unusual shape in 
order to comply with the various other legal requirements for districts, such as population equality 
and due regard for political boundaries.”).  
161 See, e.g., League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detner, 172 So.2d 363, 370–75 (Fla. 2015) (“These 
‘express new standards’ thus afford Florida citizens ‘explicit constitutional protection’ under article 
III, section 20, of the Florida Constitution, ‘against partisan political gerrymandering.’”). 
162 The states which contain some variation on this provision in either their statutes or constitutions 
(and thus, the only states where this provision is pertinent) are Arizona, California, Colorado, 
Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Michigan, Montana, New York, Ohio, Oregon, Utah and 
Washington.  See ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. II, § 1(15) (“Party registration and voting history data 
shall be excluded from the initial phase of the mapping process but may be used to test maps for 
compliance with the above goals.  The places of residence of incumbents or candidates shall not be 
identified or considered.”); CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(e) (“The place of residence of any incumbent 
or political candidate shall not be considered in the creation of a map.  Districts shall not be drawn 
for the purpose of favoring or discriminating against an incumbent, political candidate, or political 
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Outside of those states, these provisions offer little to prospective plaintiffs,  
 
                                                     
party.”); COLO. CONST. art. V, §§ 44.3(4)(a) & 48.1(4)(a) (“No map may be approved by the 
commission or given effect by the supreme court if:  (a) it has been drawn for the purpose of 
protecting one or more incumbent members, or one or more declared candidates, of the [united 
states house of representatives/senate or house of representatives], or any political party . . . .”); 
DEL. CONST. art. II § 2A (“Redistricting and reapportionment . . . shall be accomplished in 
accordance with the following criteria: each new Representative District shall, insofar as is possible 
. . . shall not be so created as to unduly favor any person or political party.”); FLA. CONST. art. III, 
§§ 20, 21 (“In establishing congressional district boundaries . . . no apportionment plan or individual 
district shall be drawn with the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent”; “In 
establishing legislative district boundaries . . . no apportionment plan or district shall be drawn with 
the intent to favor or disfavor a political party or an incumbent . . . .”); HAW. CONST. art. IV, § 6(2) 
(“No district shall be so drawn as to unduly favor a person or political faction.”); MICH. CONST. 
art. IV, § 6(13) (“[C]ommunities of interest do not include relationships with political parties, 
incumbents, or political candidates.  Districts shall not provide a disproportionate advantage to any 
political party.  A disproportionate advantage shall be determined using accepted measures of 
partisan fairness.  Districts shall not favor or disfavor an incumbent elected official or a candidate.”); 
N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4(c)(5) (“Districts shall not be drawn . . . for the purpose of favoring or 
disfavoring incumbents or other particular candidates or political parties.”); OHIO CONST. art. XI, 
§ 6(A) (“No General Assembly plan shall be drawn primarily to favor or disfavor a political party.”); 
WASH. CONST. art. II, § 43(5)(“The commission’s plan shall not be drawn purposely to favor or 
discriminate against any political party or group.”); Idaho Stat. Code 72-1506(8) (“Counties shall 
not be divided to protect a particular political party or a particular incumbent.”); Iowa Code § 
42.4(5) (“No district shall be drawn for the purpose of favoring a political party, incumbent legislator 
or member of Congress, or other person or group . . . . In establishing districts, no use shall be made 
of any of the following data:  (1) Addresses of incumbent legislators or members of Congress. (2) 
Political affiliations of registered voters. (3) Previous election results.”); Mt. Code Ann. 5-1-115(3) 
(“A district may not be drawn for the purposes of favoring a political party or an incumbent 
legislator or member of congress. The following data or information may not be considered in the 
development of a plan:  (a) addresses of incumbent legislators or members of congress; (b) political 
affiliations of registered voters; (c) partisan political voter lists; or (d) previous election results, unless 
required as a remedy by a court.”).  Oregon Rev. Stat. 188.010 (“The Legislative Assembly or the 
Secretary of State, whichever is applicable, shall consider the following criteria when apportioning 
the state into congressional and legislative districts: . . . (2) No district shall be drawn for the purpose 
of favoring any political party, incumbent legislator or other person.”); Utah Code Ann. 20A-19-
103(3) (“The Legislature and Commission may not divide districts in a manner that purposefully or 
unduly favors or disfavors any incumbent elected official, candidate, or prospective candidate for 
elective office, or any political party.”).  Missouri uses a slightly different provision; instead of a 
negative provision like the prohibitions above, it uses a positive provision mandating partisan 
fairness in the construction of districts.  See MO. CONST. art. III, § 3(c)(1)(b) (“Districts shall be 
designed in a manner that achieves both partisan fairness and, secondarily, competitiveness.  
Partisan fairness means that parties shall be able to translate their popular support into legislative 
representation with approximately equal efficiency.”).  It should be noted that the majority of states 
with these provisions also use redistricting commissions, of some form, to redraw district lines.  
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although some state supreme courts have been willing to entertain common  
law prohibitions on partisan gerrymandering in unique circumstances.163 
2. Competitiveness/Proportional Representation 
Four states, Arizona,164 Colorado,165 Missouri,166 and Washington167, 
have laws which specifically call for creating competitive districts.  Ohio 
requires a different concept, proportional representation.168  These 
provisions can combat gerrymandering by making districting plans strive for 
competition in districts, or satisfy some type of distribution of seats depending 
on a state’s two-party vote share.  As with prohibitions on partisan 
gerrymandering or the use of political data, these provisions place a direct 
constraint on how districts may be constructed from a partisan standpoint.  
                                                     
163 See, e.g., Peterson v. Borst, 786 N.E.2d 668, 669–71 (Ind. 2003) (per curiam) (“[W]e conclude that 
the Superior Court’s adoption of a plan that has been uniformly supported by one major political 
party and uniformly opposed by the other is incompatible with applicable principles of both the 
appearance and fact of judicial independence and neutrality.  Because of the emergency nature of 
this appeal, we adopt a plan that we have drawn with the consideration of only factors required by 
applicable federal and State law, and without consideration of party affiliation or incumbency.”);  
see also Burling v. Chandler, 804 A.2d 471, 486 (N.H. 2002) (reapportioning districts to uphold “the 
fundamental democratic principle of one person/one vote”).  
164 AZ. CONST. art. IV, pt II, § 1(14)F (“To the extent practicable, competitive districts should be 
favored where to do so would create no significant detriment to the other goals”).  
165 COLO. CONST. art. V, § 44.3(3)(a) & (d) and § 48.1(3)(“(a) Thereafter, the commission shall, to the 
extent possible, maximize the number of politically competitive districts. . . . For purposes of this 
subsection, ‘competitive’ means having a reasonable potential for the party affiliation of the district’s 
representative to change at least once between federal decennial censuses.  Competitiveness may 
be measured by factors such as a proposed district’s past election results, a proposed district’s 
political party registration data, and evidence-based analyses of proposed districts.”). 
166 MO. CONST. art III, § 3(c)(1)(b) (“Districts shall be designed in a manner that achieves both partisan 
fairness and, secondarily, competitiveness.  Partisan fairness means that parties shall be able to 
translate their popular support into legislative representation with approximately equal efficiency.  
Competitiveness means that parties’ legislative representation shall be substantially and similarly 
responsive to shifts in the electorate’s preferences.”). 
167 Wash. Rev. Stat. 44.05.090(5) (“The commission shall exercise its powers to provide fair and 
effective representation and to encourage electoral competition.”).  
168 OHIO CONST. art. XI, § 6(B) (“The statewide proportion of districts whose voters, based on 
statewide state and federal partisan general election results during the last ten years, favor each 
political party shall correspond closely to the statewide preferences of the voters of Ohio.”).  
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D. Other Arguments: District-by-District Constitutional Provisions 
All of the provisions discussed to this point have addressed how state 
constitutional provisions may protect more general rights of fairness in 
redistricting.  But plaintiffs should also consider more explicit constitutional 
mandates with which districting plans must comply.  For example, cases 
relying on compactness can often be seen as a proxy for preventing 
gerrymandering,169 and other traditional criteria like contiguity and 
preserving pre-existing political boundaries contain a rich jurisprudence of 
striking down districting plans.170  By pegging their broader arguments about 
vote dilution and mistreatment of voters to these more tried and true 
provisions, plaintiffs can give courts a safe path of precedent.  
1. Compactness 
Thirty-three states require that state legislative districts, congressional 
districts, or both be compact, either constitutionally or by statute.  
Compactness has several dozen legally accepted meanings, some based 
purely on geometric shape and some on population patterns.  Courts’ 
struggles with defining compactness have led some state courts to conclude 
that legislatures themselves get to decide whether a district is compact, 
effectively neutering the provision altogether.171  But some state courts see 
compactness provisions in their intended light, as a check on the power of 
the legislature.  From this conclusion, it necessarily follows that the courts, 
not legislatures, should determine which definitions of compactness to use 
when evaluating such claims.172  Missouri’s Constitution states:  “In general, 
compact districts are those which are square, rectangular, or hexagonal in 
                                                     
169 See, e.g., Micah Altman, Modeling the Effect of Mandatory District Compactness on Partisan Gerrymanders, 17 
POL. GEOGRAPHY 989 (1998); Richard Niemi, Bernard Grofman, Carl Carlucci, and Thomas 
Hofeller, Measuring Compactness and the Role of a Compactness Standard in a Test for Partisan and Racial 
Gerrymandering, 52 J. POL. 1155 (1990).  
170 Because these three criteria are considered to be “traditional,” the Supreme Court has held that 
they are the only permissible reasons for which a state may depart from the one person, one vote 
requirement. 
171 See Vesilind v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 813 S.E.2d 739 (Va. 2018) (“(S)ocial scientists have 
developed at least 50 different methods of measuring compactness.”). 
172 See, e.g., In re 2001 Redistricting Cases, 44 P.3d 141 (Alaska 2002); Hall v. Moreno, 270 P.3d 961 
(Colo. 2012); In re S. J. Res. Of Leg. Apportionment 1176, 83 So.3d 597 (Fla. 2012).  
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shape to the extent permitted by natural or political boundaries.”173  Missouri 
has used this compactness requirement as an explicit check on partisan 
gerrymandering.174 
2. Contiguity 
Along with compactness, contiguity is one of the oldest redistricting 
requirements.  Forty-two state constitutions require that districts be 
contiguous, and all fifty states require it in some form (statute, constitution, 
or judicial precedent).175  Although a few cases have overturned redistricting 
plans based on the contiguity requirement, many have “stretched” the 
provision to include rivers, highways, mountain ranges, or even two corners 
meeting in a single point.176  While contiguity is a fairly weak requirement, it 
does prevent the packing of voters into isolated islands based on their voting 
                                                     
173 MO. CONST., art. III, § 3(c)(1)(e). 
174 See State ex rel. Barrett v. Hitchcock, 146 S.W. 40, 65 (Mo. 1912) (“There, as here, the evident 
intention of the people of the state, as manifested in said constitutional provisions, is that, when 
counties are combined to form a district, they must not only touch each other, but they must be 
closely united territory, and thereby guard, as far as practicable, the system of representation 
adopted in the state against the legislative evil commonly known as the ‘gerrymander.’  In a 
republican form of government, each citizen should have an equal voice in the enactment of the 
laws, their interpretation, and execution.  This is the true spirit and meaning of our Constitution 
and laws, and the judge upon the bench, in construing and giving them effect, should put aside 
party feeling and be governed solely by the spirit of the old proverbial saying, ‘Tros Tyriusque mihi 
nullo discrimine agetur.’  Inequality of representation in a republican form of government is just as 
offensive and unjust as is taxation without representation.  Both are repugnant to and inconsistent 
with the American idea of government and true citizenship.”). 
175 See Redistricting Criteria, NAT’L CONF. OF STATE LEGISLATURES, http://www.ncsl.org/research/
redistricting/redistricting-criteria.aspx (last updated Apr. 23, 2019); see also infra Appendix A.  
176 See In re Apportionment Law Appearing as S. J. Res. 1 E, 414 So. 2d 1040, 1051 (Fla. 1982) (holding 
that a district lacks contiguity only when a part is isolated from the rest by the territory of another 
district, and that because the touching of points means there is no district between two parts of a 
single district, point contiguity satisfies the contiguity requirement); Bd. of Superiors of Houghton 
v. Blacker, 52 N.W. 951, 953 (Mich. 1892) (holding that islands in the Great Lakes could be 
contiguous over water); In re Sherill v. O’Brien, 81 N.E. 124 (N.Y. 1907) (holding that the ordinary 
and plain meaning of the word “contiguous” is not a reference to nearness or proximity, but rather 
territory which is touching, adjoining, and connected, as distinguished from territory separated by 
other territory); Parella v. Montalbano, 899 A.2d 1226, 1244–45 (R.I. 2006); Ariz. Minority Coal. 
for Fair Redistricting v. Ariz. Indep. Redistricting Comm'n, 121 P.3d 843, 849, 869–70 (Ariz. Ct. 
App. 2005) (holding that a narrow, 103-mile serpentine corridor partially following the Colorado 
River through the Grand Canyon to connect two Native American tribes’ reservations into a single 
majority-minority district satisfied the contiguity requirement because the district was 
geographically connected). 
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history, instead requiring at least some nominal connection between the 
various points in a district. 
3. Preserving Pre-Existing Political Boundaries 
Thirty-three state constitutions place limits on dividing local government 
units or crossing local government boundaries in the creation of election 
districts.177  The most frequently addressed government unit is the county.178  
Historically, counties in many cases reflected “communities of interest,” 
another traditional redistricting principle in many state constitutions.  Early 
state constitutions frequently had bicameral legislatures with at least one 
house based on representation by county, until Lucas v. 44th General Assembly 
of Colorado179 and Reynolds v. Sims180 declared such systems of representation 
unconstitutional.  These two 1964 cases struck down state prohibitions 
against crossing political boundaries and created a requirement that districts 
be of near-equal population (the “one person, one vote” requirement).181  
A multitude of state courts have found counties to be a critical 
“administrative community of interest” due to their performance of critical 
governmental functions and their role in interacting with the state 
                                                     
177 See, e.g., ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. II, §1(14) (“To the extent practicable, district lines shall use visible 
geographic features, city, town and county boundaries, and undivided census tracts.”; CAL. CONST. 
art. XXI, §2(d)(4) (“The geographic integrity of any city, county, city and county, local 
neighborhood, or local community of interest shall be respected in a manner that minimizes their 
division to the extent possible . . . .”); COLO. CONST. art V, §44.3 (2) (a) (“As much as is reasonably 
possible, the commission’s plan must preserve . . . whole political subdivisions, such as counties, 
cities, and towns.”); IOWA. CONST. art. III, § 37 (“When a congressional district is composed of two 
or more counties it shall not be entirely separated by a county belonging to another district and no 
county shall be divided in forming a congressional district.”); MD. CONST. art. III, § 4 (“Due regard 
shall be given to natural boundaries and the boundaries of political subdivisions.”); N.C. CONST. 
art. II, § 3(3) (“No county shall be divided in the formation of a senate district . . . .”); N.C. CONST. 
art. III, § 5(3) (“No county shall be divided in the formation of a representative district . . . .”). 
178 In Louisiana, counties are referred to as “parishes.” 
179 377 U.S. 713 (1964). 
180 377 U.S. 533 (1964). 
181 For examples of cases striking down districting plans for violating the one person, one vote principle, 
see Gray v. Sanders, 372 U.S. 368 (1963); Legislative Research Comm’n v. Fischer, 366 S.W.3d 
905, 919 (Ky. 2012); Fischer v. State Bd. of Elections, 879 S.W.2d 475, 479 (Ky. 1994); In re 
Legislative Districting of State, 805 A.2d 292, 295 (Md. 2002); State ex rel. Teichman v. Carnahan, 
357 S.W.3d 601, 607 (Mo. 2012); State ex rel. Lockert v. Crowell, 631 S.W.2d 702, 714–15 (Tenn. 
1982); Smith v. Craddick, 471 S.W.2d 375 (Tex. 1971); Clements v. Valles, 620 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. 
1981); In re S.B. 177, 294 A.2d 653 (Vt.), modified, 294 A.2d 657 (Vt. 1972).  
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government.182  These cases frequently express concern that the efficiency of 
legislative representation would be undermined by crossing county lines.183  
There is no consensus among the states as to whether there is a ceiling on the 
number of permissible county splits in a plan, or if the number of county 
splits is a holistic analysis taken in consideration of the other principles that 
are considered when drawing a districting plan.  For example, the Colorado 
Supreme Court in 1992 used a holistic analysis in striking down a state 
legislative district as unconstitutionally noncompact,184 while the Idaho 
Supreme Court adopted a rigid ranking of criteria which gave that State’s 
prevention of county splits preeminence, second only to federal mandates.185  
Similarly, Nebraska follows a practicability standard, requiring that districts 
be constructed of whole county units wherever practicable.186  The absence 
of a unified approach will require each state to establish its own route to 
identifying if and when counties and other political boundaries have been 
split too many times.  
                                                     
182 In re Legislative Districting of State, 805 A.2d 292, 319 (Md. 2002); In re Reapportionment of Colo. 
Gen. Assembly, 45 P.3d 1237, 1248 (Colo. 2002); Scrimminger v. Sherwin, 291 A.2d 134, 141 (N.J. 
1972); Jackman v. Bodine, 205 A.2d 713, 718 (N.J. 1964); Stephenson v. Bartlett, 562 S.E.2d 377, 
385 (N.C. 2002). 
183 Legislative Redistricting Cases, 629 A.2d 646, 666 (Md. 1993); In re Reapportionment of Towns of 
Hartland, Windsor & W. Windsor, 624 A.2d 323, 330 (Vt. 1993); Wilson v. Eu, 823 P.2d 545, 553 
(Cal. 1992); Brown v. Saunders, 166 S.E. 105, 107–08 (Va. 1932). 
184 In re Colo. Gen. Assembly, 828 P.2d 185, 195–96 (Colo. 1992) (holding that making an assertion 
that a county split is necessary to comply with other criteria, such as compactness, did not justify 
the creation of a protrusion splitting the city of Aspen and Pitkin County).  The analysis in this case 
highlights the importance of considering traditional redistricting principles in concert with one 
another, because state courts frequently consider evidence of a potential violation of one criterion 
as supporting evidence for the violation of another criterion.  
185 In other words, counties must be kept whole first before applying any nonfederal criterion.  See 
Bingham Cty. v. Idaho Comm’n for Reapportionment, 55 P.3d 863, 869 (Idaho 2002).  
186 See Day v. Nelson, 485 N.W.2d 583, 586 (Neb. 1992) (“[T]he only counties in this state where a 
single legislative district could lawfully follow the entire county boundaries are Lincoln County and 
Madison County.  It is obvious that according to the plain language of article III, § 5, Madison 
County must constitute a single district unless not ‘practicable.’  It is also obvious that the presence 
of a number of proposed plans that apportion the state leaving District 21 substantially intact makes 
following that county’s boundaries ‘practicable.’  The suggestion by the State in its brief that the 
process is entirely political ignores the mandatory ‘shall’ in the constitutional section and would 
equate it with the permissive ‘may.’”).  
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4. Preserving Communities of Interest 
Of all the criteria considered by most states, perhaps the most malleable 
and least quantifiable187 yet, of central conceptual importance, is that districts 
preserve “communities of interest.”  The justification of states considering 
communities of interest in the redistricting process was well stated in Maestas 
v. Hall:  “The rationale for giving due weight to clear communities of interest 
is that to be an effective representative, a legislator must represent a district 
that has a reasonable homogeneity of needs and interests; otherwise the 
policies he supports will not represent the preferences of most of his 
constituents.”188  
A few states define communities of interest.189  Among the more specific 
provisions, the Alaska Constitution defines communities of interest as “a 
relatively integrated socioeconomic area.”190  The California Constitution 
describes a community of interest as a “contiguous population which shares 
common social and economic interests that should be included within a 
single district for purposes of fair representation . . . [such as] an urban area, 
a rural area, an industrial area, or an agricultural area” as well as “those 
common to areas in which the people share similar living standards, use the 
same transportation facilities, have similar work opportunities, or have access 
                                                     
187 An empirical approach to defining communities of interest is described by Stephen J. Malone in his 
article Recognizing Communities of Interest in a Legislative Apportionment Plan, 83 VA. L. REV. 461, 480 
(1997): 
Yet a community of interest may still exist within the district because of inherent socio-
economic characteristics among district residents that cause them to share the same 
concerns.  In such situations, empirical data may identify these latent communities of 
interest.  Census data on population density, race, national origin, income, education, 
ancestry, occupation, religion and household size can point to commonalities within the 
population that may indicate the existence of a community of interest.  
With the rise of Big Data, it is not outside the realm of possibility that things such as Google search 
terms, or purchasing habits, could also be used to define such definitions.  The diametric approach 
would be to use only data collected by the Census.  But speculating on the scope of how to 
empirically capture a community of interest is beyond the scope of this Article.  
188 274 P.3d 66, 78 (N.M. 2012) (internal citations omitted).  
189 Apart from the states set out below, Vermont also provides a definition of community of interest 
beyond a bare-bones recitation of the phrase.  Vt. Stat., tit. 17, § 1903(b)(2) (2018) (“The 
representative and senatorial districts shall be formed consistent with the following policies insofar 
as practicable: . . . recognition and maintenance of patterns of geography, social interaction, trade, 
political ties, and common interests.”).  
190 ARK. CONST. art. VI, § 6.  
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to the same media of communication relevant to the election process.”191  
Colorado, meanwhile, defines communities of interest in terms of “issues” 
voters care about, such as issues of education, employment, environment, 
public health, transportation, water needs, or issues of demonstrable regional 
significance.192  Colorado goes further, explicitly noting that racial, ethnic, 
and language minority groups could also constitute communities of 
interest.193  California and Colorado explicitly prohibit political parties, 
incumbents, or candidates from factoring into any consideration of what 
constitutes a community of interest.194  Most states195 leave the term wholly 
undefined, leaving it up to legislatures and courts to read meaning into the 
phrase.196 
There is also precedent for using the concept of communities of interest 
in the absence of statutory or constitutional language.  Alabama and 
                                                     
191 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4).  Additionally, several California Commissioners described to 
members of the Princeton Gerrymandering Project and graduate students at Princeton University’s 
Woodrow Wilson School of Public and International Affairs that the “public comment” process 
inherent in California’s independent Citizens Redistricting Commission was a useful tool for 
defining communities of interest.  Thus, litigants can look to public input sessions for information 
on what considerations may have been made by legislators in creating districts, and whether public 
input was heeded or disregarded. 
192 COLO. CONST. amend. Z.  
193 Id. 
194 CAL. CONST. art. XXI, § 2(d)(4) (“Communities of interest shall not include relationships with 
political parties, incumbents, or political candidates.”); COLO. CONST. amend. Z (“‘Community of 
interest’ does not include relationships with political parties, incumbents, or political candidates.”).  
195 Thirty-one states require that either their congressional or state legislative districts (or both) be 
drawn with communities of interest in mind: nine by constitutional provision, eight by statute, the 
rest by resolutions or guidelines.  For examples of states without definitions of the phrase, see, e.g., 
ARIZ. CONST. art. IV, pt. II, § 1(14)(D) (“District boundaries shall respect communities of interest 
to the extent practicable . . . .”); N.Y. CONST. art. III, § 4 (“The Commission shall consider . . . 
communities of interest.”).  For an example of resolutions adopted by legislatures or guidelines laid 
out by commissions, see Redistricting Criteria Approved by the Courts, ARK. BOARD OF 
APPORTIONMENT, http://www.arkansasredistricting.org/redistricting-criteria (last visited Oct. 12, 
2019).  
196 Courts have gone far afield.  In Hall v. Moreno, 270 P.2d 961, 975–80 (Colo. 2012), the Supreme 
Court of Colorado identified the following “communities of interest”:  regulation of oil and gas 
development in light of fracking; agricultural lands; Hispanic voting strength; the Western Slope; 
water scarcity; local units of government; Rocky Flats radioactive cleanup; the I-70 corridor; Rocky 
Mountain national park; the pine bark beetle kill infestation; state universities; health and high-tech 
industries; rural populace; ranching; mining; tourism; alternative energy production; 
unemployment rate; mass transportation; open space and wildlife; military bases; and infrastructure 
improvement. 
 
246 JOURNAL OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAW [Vol. 22:1 
   
 
Arkansas give consideration to communities of interest despite no 
constitutional mandate to do so.  Conversely, the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court has frowned upon attempting to argue a common law right to the 
representation of communities of interest in districting.197  Thus the concept 
of communities of interest is potentially available in the construction of a 
complaint, but highly dependent on the willingness of a court in applying 
such reasoning.  
IV.  EVIDENTIARY BURDENS:  ORGANIZING GERRYMANDERING TESTS 
INTO TESTS OF INEQUALITY OF OPPORTUNITY AND INEQUITABLE 
OUTCOME 
Because each state has multiple constitutional provisions upon which a 
well-pleaded complaint could be founded, the key question is how to prove 
such a claim.  While many excellent articles have recently been written on 
this very question pertaining to proof for Free and Equal Elections Clause 
claims (as occurred in Pennsylvania), cookie-cutter evidence to prove other 
constitutional claims will not suffice.198  A wide variety of statistical tests is 
available to courts to evaluate the degree to which a district or statewide plan 
has treated a political party unfairly.  These tests can be thought of as falling 
into two major categories:  inequality of opportunity and inequitable 
outcome.  
 For example, if political party A’s average wins are much larger than the 
others, that would be evidence that the wins had been engineered to pack 
many of party A’s voters into a few districts, while cracking their other voters 
                                                     
197 See City of Manchester v. Sec’y of State, 48 A.3d 864, 878 (N.H. 2012) (holding that “[n]othing in 
the New Hampshire Constitution requires a redistricting plan to consider ‘communities of 
interest,’” and that, “although preservation of communities of interest [may be] a legitimate 
redistricting goal,” it does not mean that there is an individual right to have one’s particular 
community contained within a district).  See also In re Legislative Districting of State, 475 A.2d 428, 
445 (Md. 1984), appeal dismissed sub nom. Wiser v. Hughes, 459 U.S. 962 (1982) (mem.). 
198 See Bernard Grofman & Jonathan Cervas, Can State Courts Cure Partisan Gerrymandering:  Lessons from 
League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania (2018), 17 ELECTION L. J. 264 (2018).  
Joshua Douglas at the University of Kentucky has produced excellent work on the similar, yet 
slightly adjacent issue of the right to vote under state constitutions.  See Joshua Douglas, The Right to 
Vote Under State Constitutions, 67 VAND. L. REV. 89 (2015).  However, Mr. Douglas’s work predates 
the decision in League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth of Pennsylvania and does not address its potential 
future impacts. 
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across many other districts to allow wins by party B.  This would constitute 
a systematic deprivation of the opportunity to elect representatives at a 
statewide level.  The same districting pattern could be examined to see 
whether it has led to inequities of representational outcome.  A variety of tests 
of outcome have been developed, including the efficiency gap,199 non-map-
based computer simulation,200 and detailed examination of maps using 
Monte Carlo map drawing methods.201 
It should be noted that the appropriate tests will vary by state.  For 
example, closely divided states such as North Carolina would be most 
appropriately tested using measures of partisan symmetry such as the 
lopsided wins test or the reliable wins test.  A more lopsided partisan state 
such as Maryland would benefit from an examination of whether a districting 
plan was drawn to give excessively uniform wins to Democratic voters, thus 
allowing Democrats to win more districts than would be expected from a 
more natural pattern.202  In all cases, a detailed examination of alternative 
maps provides a way of testing whether the actual map gives an exceptional 
advantage to a political party, in the context of the state’s particular 
geographic and political circumstances, as well as the specific laws governing 
redistricting in that state.203 
V. A STATE-BY-STATE VIEW OF FIELD OF PLAY 
With causes of action abounding in state constitutions, the next question 
reformers must ask is whether a court is the likeliest route for achieving a 
remedy.  This can be difficult to ascertain.  Unlike federal courts, judges in 
                                                     
199 See Nick Stephanopoulos & Eric McGhee, Partisan Gerrymandering and the Efficiency Gap, 82 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 831, 900 (2015). 
200 See Sam Wang, Let Math Save Our Democracy, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 5, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/
2015/12/06/opinion/sunday/let-math-save-our-democracy.html.  
201 See Ben Fifield et al., A New Automated Redistricting Simulator Using Markov Chain Monte Carlo 
(July 1, 2019) (unpublished manuscript), https://imai.fas.harvard.edu/research/files/redist.pdf.  
Monte Carlo map-drawing methods involve taking a starting map, or “seed” map, and running a 
computer program which makes very small changes many, many times.  
202 For a treatment of how to select tests, see Michael D. McDonald, Making a Case for Two Paths Forward 
in Light of Gill v. Whitford, 17 ELECTION L.J. 315, 316 (2018); Samuel S.-H. Wang, Three Practical 
Tests for Gerrymandering:  Application to Maryland and Wisconsin, 15 ELECTION L.J. 367, 376 (2016).  
203 See Gregory Herschlag et al., Quantifying Gerrymandering in North Carolina (Jan. 9, 2018) (unpublished 
manuscript), https://arxiv.org/pdf/1801.03783.pdf.  
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state courts are selected via a variety of methods:  lifetime appointments, 
appointments with retention elections, and partisan or nonpartisan elections.  
State court judges’ opinions may be colored by the ramifications for their 
continued employment.204  On the flip side, the nominal political party of the 
judge may not always reflect how judges will decide an issue.  
Nonetheless, partisanship provides a starting point for evaluating the tilt 
of a court.  We believe there are three broad categories of state courts which 
may be receptive to partisan gerrymandering claims:  first, states where a 
substantial fraction of the high court’s membership is of opposite partisanship 
to the state legislature that drew an offending plan; second, courts that are 
philosophically inclined to take an expansive view of voting rights; and third, 
courts with histories of policing redistricting.  This Part will highlight 
examples of states which exemplify these reform opportunities.205  Details for 
all states can be found in Appendix B. 
A. Philosophically Inclined Towards Expansive Views of Voting Rights:  Pennsylvania 
When the Pennsylvania Supreme Court struck down the 
Commonwealth’s congressional partisan gerrymander, observers and 
legislators noted that the decision may not have been based on the law, but 
instead stemmed from a partisan divide:  the Court was controlled by 
Democrats, while Republicans dominated the state legislature.206  Some 
members of the legislature were so incensed by the decision that they 
                                                     
204 Caperton v. A. T. Massey Coal Co., Inc., 556 U.S. 868 (2009) (“Under our precedents there are 
objective standards that require recusal when ‘the probability of actual bias on the part of the judge  
or decisionmaker is too high to be constitutionally tolerable.’  Applying those precedents, we find 
that, in all the circumstances of this case, due process requires recusal.”) (internal citations omitted).  
205 These categories are not mutually exclusive; it is possible (if not probable) that several states will fall 
into multiple categories.  Those multiple-category states are very ripe for partisan gerrymandering 
challenges in their courts. 
206 See, e.g., Robert Barnes, Supreme Court Refuses to Block Pa. Ruling Invalidating Congressional Map, WASH. 
POST (Feb. 5, 2018), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/supreme-court-
refuses-to-block-pa-ruling-invalidating-congressional-mapdecision-means-2018-elections-in-the-st
ate-will-probably-be-held-in-districts-far-more-favorable-to-democrats/2018/02/05/2d758f90-0a
a3-11e8-8890-372e2047c935_story.html; David Jackson, Trump Urges Pennsylvania Republicans to Take 
Congressional District Map Fight to High Court, USA TODAY (Feb. 20, 2018), 
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/2018/02/20/trump-urges-pennsylvania-republ
icans-take-congressional-district-map-fight-high-court/354088002/; Joseph Ax, Supreme Court 
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threatened to impeach the justices in the majority.  The decision was seen as 
a threat to the independence of the judiciary,207 and Republican leadership 
ultimately did not take up the impeachment movement.208   
B.  The Opposite Party of the Offending Legislature:  North Carolina  
The North Carolina electorate is closely divided between Democrats and 
Republicans, and partisan warfare there has been especially bitter over the 
last decade.  North Carolina is also a state where redistricting is not subject 
to gubernatorial veto.209  Thus, without a check on its power, the dominant 
party in the General Assembly can potentially maintain power indefinitely.  
The congressional and legislative district maps of North Carolina are among 
the most biased in the nation210 and have inspired a tremendous amount of 
litigation.211  Under these circumstances, a judicial check takes on central 
importance. 
In 2018, Anita Earls was elected to the North Carolina Supreme Court, 
changing the court from four Democrats, three Republicans to five 
Democrats, two Republicans.212  Justice Earls is also known for her advocacy 
of voting rights.  (In light of recent retirements, the Democrats now 
command an imposing 6–1 majority on the State’s supreme court.)  
Reformers brought a lawsuit within one week of the 2018 election.  They 
contended that the state legislative plan violated three separate provisions of 
                                                     
207 Jan Murphy, PA Supreme Court Chief Justice Sees Impeachment Resolutions as ‘Attack Upon an Independent 
Judiciary,’ PENNLIVE (Mar. 22, 2018), https://www.pennlive.com/politics/2018/03/ 
pa_supreme_court_chief_justice.html.  
208 See Pennsylvania Lawmakers Threaten to Impeach Judges, WASH. POST (Mar. 27, 2018),  https://www.wa
shingtonpost.com/opinions/pennsylvania-lawmakers-threatened-to-impeach-state-judges-its-a-da
ngerous-trend/2018/03/27/be83cd78-312f-11e8-94fa-32d48460b955_story.html.  
209 Justin Levitt, All About Redistricting:  Professor Justin Levitt's Guide to Drawing the Electoral Lines, 
http://redistricting.lls.edu/states-NC.php (last visited Oct. 12, 2019).  
210 State-by-State Redistricting Reform:  The Local Routes, PRINCETON GERRYMANDERING PROJECT, 
http://gerrymander.princeton.edu (last visited Aug. 20, 2019).  This, of course, may change 
following the conclusion of the Lewis case’s remedial phase. 
211 See All About Redistricting: Professor Justin Levitt's Guide to Drawing the Electoral Lines, 
http://redistricting.lls.edu/states-NC.php#litigation (last visited Aug. 20, 2019).  
212 The North Carolina GOP went to exceptional lengths to try to prevent Justice Earls from winning 
her seat on the court, repeatedly changing the laws around election to the court in an effort to 
bolster the Republican incumbent.  In the end, two Republicans and Earls ran on the partisan 
ballot, with Earls winning by double-digits.  See Will Doran, Democrat Anita Earls Claims Victory in NC 
Supreme Court Race, NEWS & OBSERVER (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.newsobserver.com/ 
news/politics-government/article221037190.html.  
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the North Carolina Constitution:  the Equal Protection Clause, the Free 
Elections Clause, and the Free Speech and Association clauses.213  
Defendants made a motion to move the case to federal court.  Because of the 
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, the case was remanded to the state 
court.214  
In the Superior Court, a three-judge panel unanimously found that the 
plan was unconstitutional and ordered it to be redrawn.  The court cited 
twenty-seven North Carolina precedent cases in the section of its opinion 
dealing with claims under the North Carolina Constitution, ten of them 
construing the “Fair Elections” provision (four of which were decided in the 
19th century), seven construing Equal Protection, six construing Free Speech 
and Assembly, and nine on expression.  The depth of case law on the “Fair 
Elections” provision relied heavily on state rather than federal cases.  The 
other subsections relied heavily on U.S. Supreme Court decisions, especially 
that of Justice Kagan in Gill.215  Legislators declined to appeal the case to the 
North Carolina Supreme Court, perhaps because doing so would create a 
binding precedent for future cases.  
C. A History of Policing Gerrymanders:  Maryland 
Maryland has a history of judicially reviewing districting plans, focused 
on the issue of compactness.  Since the legislative compactness provision was 
added to the state constitution in 1972, the Maryland Court of Appeals has 
considered the issue of compactness each decade.  In 1982, the court went 
so far as to say that the compactness provision was an anti-partisan 
gerrymandering constitutional amendment:  
[T]he compactness requirement in state constitutions is intended to prevent 
political gerrymandering.  Oddly shaped or irregularly sized districts of 
themselves do not, therefore, ordinarily constitute evidence of 
gerrymandering and noncompactness.  On the contrary, an affirmative 
showing is ordinarily required to demonstrate that such districts were 
intentionally so drawn to produce an unfair political result, that is, to dilute 
or enhance the voting strength of discrete groups for partisan political 
advantage or other impermissible purposes.  Thus, irregularity of shape or 
                                                     
213 See Common Cause v. Lewis, 358 F. Supp. 3d 505, 507–08 (E.D.N.C. 2019). 
214 Id. at 507. 
215 Common Cause v. Lewis, No. 18 CVS 014001, slip op. at 298 (N.C. Super Ct.  Sept. 3, 2019). 
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size of a district is not a litmus test proving violation of the compactness 
requirement.216 
In the end, the Court of Appeals declined to strike down the plan, instead 
showing deference to the legislature.  After the 1990 redistricting cycle, faced 
with another compactness case, the Court once again declined to strike down 
a plan as unconstitutionally noncompact.217 
In 2002, the Court of Appeals finally struck down a legislative districting 
plan as unconstitutionally noncompact.218  In so doing, the court clarified the 
previously broad deference granted to the legislature, stating that while the 
responsibility to redistrict requires the latitude to consider factors mandated 
by the constitution as well as other factors (which may well be political in 
nature), the constitution ultimately trumps political considerations.219  While 
the Court declined to rule on the compactness challenge to state legislative 
districts in 2011, the Court of Appeals’ willingness to strike down legislative 
districting plans in the past may make them predisposed to make a similar 
ruling about the state’s congressional gerrymander or other future 
gerrymanders.220 
This route for litigation would have to be balanced against the fact that 
another route for redress is available.  Maryland redistricting requires the 
signature of the Governor, at this time Larry Hogan, a Republican.  
Reformers may be able to achieve less partisan redistricting in the 2020 cycle 
that way. 
                                                     
216 In re Legislative Districting of the State, 475 A.2d 428, 436–40 (Md. 1982). 
217 Legislative Redistricting Cases, 629 A.2d 646, 658 (Md. 1993). 
218 In re Legislative Districting of the State, 805 A.2d 292, 295 (Md. 2002). 
219 Id. at 326 (“That a plan may have been the result of discretion, exercised by the one entrusted with 
the responsibility of generating the plan, will not save it.  The constitution ’trumps’ political 
considerations.  Politics or non-constitutional considerations never ’trump’ constitutional 
requirements.”). 
220 Like Pennsylvania and North Carolina, Maryland’s Constitution guarantees that all elections must 
be “free and frequent.”  MD. CONST. art. VII.  However, the provision comes after a reference to 
the legislature, so it may be limited to legislative elections.  Even if that is the case, the Maryland 
Constitution protects freedom of speech, freedom of association, the equal protection of the laws, 
and the purity of elections.  See infra Appendix A. 
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CONCLUSION 
With fifty different judicial systems evolving their own histories and 
doctrines, it is inevitable that some states will emerge with more active 
judiciaries in the redistricting context than others.  Some states have a history 
of requiring judicial review of at least some of their plans.  Other states simply 
have a history of scrutinizing redistricting schemes over the years.221  
Reformers should consult the precedents of their individual state supreme 
courts to find histories of review.  Even if they do not find a broad history of 
policing gerrymandering claims, decisions on other election law issues may 
invite an opening to similar decisions in the redistricting context.  If the U.S. 
Supreme Court takes limited action or fails to act, federalism offers states an 
opportunity to take a locally specific approach to placing guardrails on the 
practice of partisan gerrymandering. 
                                                     
221 Examples include Alaska, California, Florida, Kentucky, Maryland, Michigan, and Missouri. 
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APPENDIX A: 
Table 1:  Major Cases Striking Down Redistricting Plans Under State Constitutional 
Protections222 
State Case Name Citation Pertinent 
Constitutional 
Provisions 





California Assembly of State 
of Cal. v. 
Deukmejian 
639 P.2d 939 
(1982) 
One Person, One 
Vote (state & fed) 




55 P.3d 863 
(2002) 
One Person, One 
Vote (state & fed) 
Preexisting Political 
Boundaries 
Virginia Brown v. 
Saunders 
166 S.E. 105 
(1932) 
One Person, One 
Vote (state & fed) 
Illinois Burris v. Ryan 588 N.E.2d 
1023 (1991) 
Compactness 
One Person, One 
Vote 
Alaska Carpenter v. 
Hammond 
667 P.2d 1204 
(1983) 
Compactness 




                                                     
222 While state-level issues are frequently intertwined with federal claims, the fact that those cases are 
almost universally heard in federal court means they are not indicative—necessarily—of state 
judges’ thought processes, regardless of how well the federal judges guess their intent as required 
by Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).  As a result, the authors have decided to exclude 
those cases from this paper.  
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Freedom of Speech 
Freedom of Assembly 




Idaho Hellar v. 
Cenarrusa 
682 P.2d 539 
(1984) 
Equal Protection 
(state & federal) 
Right to Vote 
Preexisting Political 
Subdivisions 
Alaska Hickel v. 
Southeast 
Conference 





Alaska In re 2001 
Redistricting 
Cases 
44 P.3d 141 
(2002) 
Compactness 
One Person, One 
Vote (state & fed) 
Maryland In re Legislative 
Districting of State 











Colorado In re 
Reapportionment 
of Colo. Gen. 
Assembly 
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Vermont In re 
Reapportionment 
of Towns of 
Hartland, 
Windsor & W. 
Windsor 













Alaska Kenai Peninsula 
Borough v. State 




Florida League of Women 
Voters of Fla. v. 
Detzner 









181 A.3d 1083 
(2018) 
Free and Equal 
Elections 
Colorado Mauff v. People 123 P. 101 
(1912) 
Purity of Elections 
Colorado Neelley v. Farr 158 P. 458 
(1916) 
Freedom of Speech 
(state) 
Freedom of Assembly 
(state) 
Free and Open 
Elections 
Missouri Pearson v. Koster 359 S.2.3d 35 
(2012) 
Compactness 
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Colorado People ex rel. 
Salazar v. 
Davidson 




New Jersey Scrimminger v. 
Sherwin 
291 A.2d 134 
(1972) 




Missouri State ex rel. Barrett 
v. Hitchcock 





West Virginia State ex rel. Smith 
v. Gore 
143 S.E.2d 791 
(1965) 
One Person, One 
Vote (state) 
North Dakota State v. Hamilton 129 N.W. 916 
(1910) 
Uniform Laws 
Delaware Young v. Red 
Clay Consol. Sch. 
Dist. 
122 A.3d 784 
(Del. Ch. 2015) 
Elections Clause 
(state’s Equal 
Protection clause for 
election issues) 
 
Table 2:  Major Cases Striking Down Election Laws Under State Constitutional 
Protections 
State Case Name Citation Pertinent 
Constitutional 
Provisions 
Kentucky Ferguson v. Rohde 449 S.W.2d 758 
(1970) 





Gunaji v. Macias 31 P.3d 1008 
(2001) 
Free & Open 
Elections (counting 
of ballots) 
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Kentucky Hillard v. Lakes 172 S.W.2d 456 
(1943) 
Free and Fair 
Elections (ballot 
construction) 
Missouri Kasten v. Guth 375 S.W.2d 110 
(1964) 
Right to Vote (for 
write-in candidates) 
Kentucky Lakes v. Estridge 172 S.W.2d 454 
(1943) 
Right to Vote 
Free & Fair 
Elections (denial of 
ballot) 
Kentucky Lee v. 
Commonwealth 





California Serrano v. Priest 557 P.2d 929 
(1976) 
Equal Protection 
(state) (public school 
financing) 
Michigan Socialist Workers 
Party v. Sec’y of 
State 
317 N.W.2d 1 
(1982) 









Michigan Wells v. Kent 
County Bd. of 
Elections Comm’rs 
186 N.W.2d 222 
(1969) 
Purity of Elections 
(ballot design) 
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Table 3: State Constitutional Provisions, Power Balances within States in 2021, and 




















I § 4 
I § 25 
I §§ 1, 6 




IX § 200 
IX § 200 
IV § 104(29) 
 













                                                     
223 For guidance on ascertaining whether particular judges may be receptive to these arguments on 
partisan gerrymandering, see Joshua A. Douglas, State Judges and the Right to Vote, 77 Ohio St. L.J. 1, 
48 (2016). 
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Alaska** 
I § 5 
I § 6 
I § 7 
I § 1 
VI § 6 
VI § 6 
VI § 6 
VI § 6 
II § 19 
 



















II § 6 
II § 5 
II § 4 
II §§ 1–2, 13 
II § 21 
VII § 12 
IV Pt2 § 1(15) 
IV Pt2 § 1(15) 
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IV Pt2 § 1(14)F 
IV Pt2 § 1(14)C 
IV Pt2 § 1(14)C 
IV Pt2 § 1(14)E 
IV Pt2 § 1(14)D 













II § 6 
II § 4 
II § 8 
II § 3 





VIII § 3 
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I § 2(a) 
I § 3(a) 
I § 7 
I § 7 
II § 3; IV § 1.5 
II § 4 
XXI § 2(e) 
XXI § 2(e) 
XXI § 2(d)(5) 
XXI § 2(d)(3) 
XXI § 2(d)(4) 
XXI § 2(d)(4) 
IV § 16 
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Colorado** 
II § 10 
II § 24 
II § 25 
II § 5 
VII § 11 
V §§ 44.3, 48.1 
V §§ 44.3, 48.1 
V §§ 44.3, 48.1 
V §§ 44.3, 48.1 
V §§ 44.3, 48.1 
V §§ 44.3, 48.1 
V §§ 44.3, 48.1 
V § 25 
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Connecticut 
I § 4 
I § 14 
I § 8 
I § 20 
VI § 4 
III §§ 3, 4 
III § 4 
 


















I § 5 
I § 16 
I § 7 
I § 3 & V § 1 
V § 1 
II § 2A 
II § 2A 
II § 2A 
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Florida 
I § 4 
I § 5 
I § 9 
III §§ 20, 21 
III §§ 20, 21 
III §§ 20, 21 
III §§ 20, 21 
III §§ 20, 21 
 



















I § 1, ¶V 
I § 1, ¶IX 
I § 1, ¶I 
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III § 6, ¶IV No Uniform/Special 
Laws 
Hawaii** 
I § 4 
I § 4 
I § 5 
I § 5 
IV § 6 
IV § 6 
IV § 6 
IV § 6 
IV § 6 
IV § 6 
 






















I § 9 
I § 10 
I § 13 
I § 2 
Stat. 72-1506(8) 
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III § 5 













I § 4 
I § 5 
I § 2 
I § 2 
III § 3 
III § 4 
IV § 3(a) 
IV § 3(a) 
IV § 13 
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Indiana 
I § 9 
I § 31 
I § 1 
I § 12 
II § 1 
IV § 5 
IV § 23 
 

















I § 7 
I § 20 
I § 9 
Stat. 42.4(5) 
Stat. 42.4(5) 
Leg § 34 
Leg § 34 
Leg § 37 
Leg § 30 
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Kansas 
BR § 11 
BR § 3 
BR § 18 
BR § 2 
#Guidelines 












and Criteria  
for 2012 
Redistricting 
II § 17 
 



















BR § 1(fourth), 8 
BR § 1(sixth) 
BR §§11, 14 
BR § 3 
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BR § 6 
Leg § 33 



















I § 7 
I § 9 
I § 2 
I § 3 
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Maine 
I § 4 
I § 15 
I § 6-A 
I § 6-A 
IV 1st § 2;  
IX § 24 
IV 1st § 2;  
IX §  24 
IV 1st § 2;  
IX § 24 
St21-A § 1206A 
 

















DR §§ 10, 40 
DR § 24 
DR § 19 
DR § 7 
I § 7 
III § 4 
III § 4 
III § 4 
III § 33 
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1st Am. CVI 
1st Art. IX 
Am. CI §§ 1, 2 
Am. CI §§ 1, 2 
 

















I § 5 
I § 3 
I § 17 
I § 2 
II § 4(2) 
IV § 6(13)(d) 
IV § 6(13)(e) 
IV § 6(13)(g) 
IV § 6(13)(b) 
IV § 6(13)f) 
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IV § 6(13)(c) 







I § 3 
I § 7 
#S.F. No. 1326 
#S.F. No. 1326  
IV § 3 
Stat. 2.91 
#S.F. No. 1326 
XII § 1 
 




















III § 13 
III § 11 
III § 14 
XII § 247 
Code § 5-3-101 
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XIII § 254 
Code § 5-3-101 








I § 8 
I § 9 
I § 10 
I §§ 2, 14 
I § 25 
III §§ 3(c), 7 
III §§ 3(c), 7 
III §§ 3(c), 7, 45 
III §§ 3(c), 7, 45 
III §§ 3(c), 7 
III § 40 
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Montana** 
II § 7 
II § 6 
II § 17 
II § 4 
II § 13 
IV § 3 
Code 5-1-115(3) 
Code 5-1-115(3) 
V § 14(1) 






V § 12 
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Nebraska 
I § 5 
I § 19 
I § 3 
I § 3 







III § 5 
III § 5 
III § 5 
III § 18 
 

























I § 9 
I § 10 
I § 8.2 
II § 6 
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Guy v. Miller, 
No. 11 OC 
00042 1B, 2011 
WL 7665875, at 
*6 (D. Nev. Oct. 
27, 2011) 
IV § 5 










1st § 22 
1st § 32 
1st § 15 
1st §§ 2, 6 
1st § 11 
2nd §§ 11, 26 
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New Jersey** 
I § 6 
I § 18 
IV § II(3) 
IV § II(1), (3) 
IV § II(1), (3) 
 















II § 17 
II § 18 
II § 18 
II § 8 
VII § 1(B) 
Stat § 2-8D-2 







IV § 24 
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New York 
I § 8 
I § 9(1) 
I § 6 
I § 11 
III § 4(c)(5) 
III § 4(c)(5) 
III § 4(c)(4) 
III § 4(c)(3) 
III § 4(a), (c)(6) 
III § 4(c)(5) 
III § 17 
 
























I § 14 
I § 12 
I § 19 
I § 19 
I § 10 
II §§ 3(2), 5(2) 
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II §§ 3(3), 5(3) 







I § 4 
I § 5 
I § 9 
IV § 2 
IV § 2 
IV § 13 
 














I § 11 
I § 3 
I § 16 
I § 2 
XI § 6(A) 
XI § 6(B) 
XI § 6(C) 
XI §§ 3(B), 4(A) 
XI § 3(C), (D) 
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II § 26 No Uniform/Special 
Laws 
Oklahoma 
II § 22 
II § 3 
II § 8 
III § 5 
V § 9A 
V § 9A 
V § 9A 
V § 9A 
V § 59 
 
 





















I § 8 
I § 26 
I § 10 
I § 20 
II § 1 
Stat. 188.010 
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Stat. 188.010 
IV § 7 












I § 7 
I § 20 
I § 9 
I § 5 
II § 16; VII § 9 
II § 16; VII § 9 
II § 16 
III § 32 
 



















I §§ 20, 21 
I § 21 
I § 2 
I § 2 
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I § 2 
I § 2 
I § 3 
I § 3 
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South Dakota 
VI § 5 
VI § 4 
VI § 2 
VI §§ 1, 26 
VI § 19; VII § 1 
III § 5 
III § 5 
Code 2-2-41(3) 
Code 2-2-41(2) 
III § 23 
 






















I § 19 
I § 23 
I § 8 
I § 5 
IV § 1 
Cd3-102, -103 
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II § 5 & 6 







I § 8 
I § 27 
I § 19 
I §§ 3a, 13 
VI §§ 2, 4 
III § 25, 26 
III § 26 
III § 56 
 


















I § 15 
I § 1 
I § 7 
I § 17 
Cd20A-19-103 
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I § 13 
I § 20 
I § 4 
I § 8 
I § 8 
II § 13, 18 
II § 13, 18 
III § 13, 18 
St17:34A1903 
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Virginia 
I § 12 
I § 12 
I § 11 
I § 11 
I § 6 
II § 6 
II § 6 
#Exec. Order 




IV §§ 14, 15 
 






















I § 5 
I § 4 
I § 3 
I § 12 
I § 19 
II § 43(5) 
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Cd44.05.090(5) 
II § 43(5) 













III § 7 
III § 16 
III § 10 
I § 4; VI § 4 
I § 4; VI §§ 4, 6 
Cd § 1-2-1(c)(4) 
Cd § 1-2-1(c)(5) 
VI § 39 
 



















I § 3 
I § 4 
I §§ 1 & 8 
I §§ 9, 15 
IV § 4 
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IV §§ 4, 5 
IV §§ 4, 5 
Cd4.001(3) 










I § 20 
I § 21 
I § 6 
I § 3 
I § 27 
VI § 13 
III § 49 
III § 49 
III § 49 
I §§ 27, 34 
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^Puerto Rico** 
II § 4 
II § 4 
II § 2 
II § 7 
II § 7 
III § 4 
III § 4 
 




















Note: Washington, D.C. is omitted from this list because its Supreme 
Court is the D.C. Circuit Court of Appeals, meaning it is subject to federal 
review regardless of its own charter. 
 
Legend 
**= Commission states (independent or partisan) 
^= not a state 
Cd= state code 
#=reference to guidelines of legislative committees or state agencies 
~=State constitutional provision in Art. 5, Sec. 25 prohibiting special or 
local law is discretionary, not mandatory, for the legislature to follow. See 
Haase v. Starnes, 323 Ark. 263 (1996) 
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